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Reuschlein Lecture
WHY THE SUPREME COURT LIED IN PLESSY
DAVID S. BOGEN*
1. INTRODUCTION
p LESSY v. Ferguson' is high on the list of the most reviled decisions of
the Supreme Court, mentioned in the same breath as Dred Scott v.
Sandford.2 It has a number of unfortunate statements 3 and the decision
* Harold Gill Reuschlein Visiting Professor, Villanova University School of
Law, Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1962,
LL.B. 1965, Harvard University; LL.M., 1967, New York University. I would like to
thank Villanova for the opportunity afforded by the Reuschlein professorship and
the University of Maryland for a summer grant. The assistance of the staff at the
Villanova University School of Law Library, particularly Amy Spare, and the
University of Maryland School of Law Thurgood Marshall Library, particularly
Maxine Grosshans, was indispensable, as was my research assistant, Justin Browne,
University of Maryland class of 2008. Thanks also to Professor Judith Giesberg of
Villanova University for sharing with me her work on Pennsylvania streetcar
discrimination and to my Maryland colleague Gordon G. Young for his perceptive
comments.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. 60 U.S. 393 (1856); see, e.g., Geri Yonover, Note and Comment: Dead-End
Street: Discrimination, The Thirteenth Amendment, and Section 1982, 58, CHI.-KENT. L.
REv. 873, 880 n.47 (1982) (citing Laughlin McDonald, Has the Supreme Court Aban-
doned the Constitution?, SATURDAY REV., May 28, 1977 at 10); see also Frank W. Dun-
ham, Jr., Where Moussaoui Meets Hamdi, 183 MIL. L. REv. 151, 160-61 (2005); Rev.
Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., Symposium on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: The End
of Apartheid in America, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244, 245 (1986); W. Sherman Rogers,
The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and Related Considerations, 48
How. L.J. 1, 55 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (explaining that statute in question was not
"unreasonable" or "more obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment" than federal
laws segregating students in District of Columbia). The Court concluded:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.
Id. Further, the Court explained, "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial in-
stincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt
to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation."
(411)
1
Bogen: Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REvIEW
served to support more than half a century of 'Jim Crow" legislation.4
P/essy's holding and subsequent history has been discussed by legions of
scholars. 5 This Article addresses a much more limited point-its string
citation of a dozen cases.
Justice Henry Billings Brown's opinion for the Court in Plessy said that
these twelve cases held that statutes for racial separation on public convey-
ances were constitutional. 6 For that statement to be true, each case would
have to involve a statute, the statute would have to require racial segrega-
tion, and a party would have to challenge the constitutionality of the stat-
ute. His statement was demonstrably false because none of the cases
involved a challenge to a statute requiring segregation. Most of the cases
did not even involve the government except insofar as a court decided the
case. Only four cases involved a statute, and most of those statutes prohib-
ited discrimination. Only one case involved a statute that even arguably
required segregation, and the constitutionality of that statute was not an
issue in the case. All twelve cases cited by Justice Brown concerned segre-
gation decisions made by private businesses to whom the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution did not directly apply. As discussed be-
low, the cases were misrepresented, transmuted and transplanted by
Brown's opinion in constitutional soil that was almost completely foreign
to their origins.
Not only was Justice Brown wrong, but the citation error does not
appear inadvertent. He should have been aware that cases discussed in
the briefs and opinions below did not involve statutes like the one in Plessy.
More significantly, he found most of the cases outside the record. This
suggests that Justice Brown knew these cases and what they held.
Part II of this Article places the string citation in the context of the
opinion. 7 Part III examines each of the cases cited to show how they were
improperly described by the string citation. 8 Part IV discusses evidence
thatJustice Brown knew he was misstating the holdings of the cases in the
string citation.9 Part V explains reasons why the Court may have used the
Id. Finally, the Court concluded, "[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or
even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasona-
ble." Id. at 550-51.
4. For a discussion of "Jim Crow" legislation, see Rogers, supra note 2, at 55.
5. See, e.g., Hesburgh, supra note 2, at 245 (criticizing P/essy).
6. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548 (providing string citation of cases purporting to
hold statutes for racial separation on public conveyances constitutional).
7. For a discussion on the string citation in the context of the opinion, see
infra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of how the cases were improperly described, see infra notes
34-132 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of Justice Brown's knowledge of the holdings, see infra
notes 133-171 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52: p. 411
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/1
PLESSV'S STRING CITATION
cases in this way.' l Part VI suggests that this story contains potential les-
sons for other cases involving issues of equality today.11
The string citation cases illustrate the development of the idea of sep-
arate but equal in common carrier law. 12 Courts found carriers had a
common law obligation to furnish passengers with substantially equal seat-
ing, but they permitted the carrier to decide which seat a passenger would
get, even if the decision was based on race. Courts applied that under-
standing of equality to interpret statutes that required passengers be
treated "equally" and without discrimination.' 3 Although the common
law, Congress, or a state legislature could impose requirements on carriers
short of those the Equal Protection Clause demanded of state actors, the
Supreme Court in Plessy asserted that these decisions applying the com-
mon law principle were constitutional holdings.
The Plessy opinion used the string citation to claim that the Court was
following precedent-that it was only doing what "the law" required. In-
stead of examining the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court treated the Amendment's interpretation as a set-
tled matter. Thus, the Court avoided having to explain why the principles
applied to restrict private behavior should be used to determine the con-
stitutional limits on government.
There is no reason to doubt that Justice Brown honestly believed that
the principles of the common law obligation and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were the same. They focused on the same term-"equal." The re-
quirement of equality in the common law was influenced by the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the common carrier's obligations re-
flected its extraordinary public nature and the consequences of a different
interpretation would have upset deeply embedded understandings. Al-
though Justice Brown knew that the carrier cases were not statutory, he
probably regarded the distinction in this context as insignificant. Making
that distinction, however, would have diminished the effect of the string
citation without disturbing the result of the case.
There was a strong argument that the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired identity in rights regardless of color. The framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment agreed that the Amendment embedded the Civil
10. For a discussion of why the Court may have used the cases in this way, see
infra notes 172-244 and accompanying text.
11. For suggestions of how this story contains potential lessons for other cases
involving issues of equality today, see infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the development of the common law obligation of
common carriers, see infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the courts' application of "equality" as drawn from
common carrier law to interpret statutes, see infra notes 124-32 and accompanying
text.
2007]
3
Bogen: Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Rights Act of 186614 as a constitutional principle. 15 Unlike the common
law obligation of "substantial equality," the Civil Rights Act of 1866 re-
quired all citizens be given the "same" rights as white citizens.
The Fourteenth Amendment's framers probably expected the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause would be the source for the requirement of
sameness. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from abridging
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, treating all
citizens of the United States as having the same privileges and immunities;
however, the Slaughterhouse Cases16 interpreted the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause to apply only to rights arising out of the federal government.1 7
Thus, it did not apply to most areas of state law. For this reason, litigants
and the Court turned to the Equal Protection Clause'1 to afford African-
Americans the protection the Fourteenth Amendment was designed for-
and language of equality was the language of the common carrier cases.
The common carrier requirement of equality was itself influenced by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Common carrier cases required the carrier
to act reasonably in providing accommodations. After the Fourteenth
Amendment, courts held that it was unreasonable to deny substantially
equal facilities to customers willing to pay the fare. The use of the Four-
teenth Amendment to construe the carrier's obligation suggested that the
equality required of carriers satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment's
command.
The public nature of the carrier also helped make the common law
principle appear equivalent to the constitutional command.' 9 The obliga-
14. See 1866 Civil Rights Act, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27-30, (1866) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1987)).
15. See DAVID S. BOGEN, PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES 49-53 (2003) [hereinafter
PRIVILEGES &-IMMUNITIES]; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)
(Stevens) (calling for constitutional amendment because it is harder to repeal
than pass civil rights bill); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866)
(Broomall). Broomall stated:
It may be asked, why should we put a provision in the Constitution which
is already contained in an act of Congress? The Gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. Bingham] ... says the act is unconstitutional.... I differ from him
upon the law, yet it is not with that certainty of being ight that would
justify me in refusing to place the power to enact the law unmistakably in
the Constitution. On so vital a point I wish to make assurance doubly
sure.
Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2513 (1866) (Raymond) (conclud-
ing that Congress lacked power to enact civil rights bill unless Congress amended
Constitution).
16. 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (holding that privileges and immunities were rights de-
rived from federal citizenship and did not include fundamental rights of citizens
that were those of state citizenship).
17. See id. at 74-75.
18. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
19. For a discussion of Justice Brown's equating the common law principle
with the constitutional command, see infra notes 190-236 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52: p. 411
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tion itself demonstrated the unique legal status of the carrier. Carrier reg-
ulations were subject to the common law, but the common law was subject
to statute. Segregation statutes had been considered constitutional by leg-
islators and treatise writers, and the Supreme Court had not invalidated
them before Plessy. But the statutes altered the common law. Because stat-
utory compliance offered a defense to an action against a carrier, the com-
mon law requirement of equality seemed more stringent. From this
perspective, constitutional doctrine could not be expected to go any
further.
Finally, if the Court had interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
require all persons be afforded identical rights without regard to race, it
would have undermined its position on miscegenation. The common car-
rier context demonstrated that rights were not the same when defined in
racial terms; a right to ride with one's race did not insure the races had
equivalent seating. If rights are not racially defined, however, anti-misce-
genation laws are incompatible with a command that all persons have the
same rights. That helped drive the Court to conclude that equality re-
quired only substantial equivalence. The separate if equal principle of the
common law appeared to be the easiest way for the Court to retain con-
tinuity with its miscegenation decisions.
The Plessy Court's deceptive string citation suggests that the impor-
tance of classification to the Fourteenth Amendment may be overlooked,
that courts need to focus on the relation of government to the individual
and to heed the distinction between customary behavior and constitu-
tional commands. These concerns have particular relevance to contempo-
rary issues of gay marriage. We should question our assumptions carefully
before affirming laws that isolate any sector of our community.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S STRING CITATION OF TRANSPORTATION CASES
IN PLESSY
Homer A. Plessy was arrested for violating a Louisiana law requiring
segregation on railroads. He pled that the law was unconstitutional and
the state demurred. The trial judge, John H. Ferguson, ruled that there
was no unfair discrimination because both white and black passengers
would be punished for going into the car where they do not belong.
2 0
Judge Ferguson dismissed the plea and ordered Plessy to plead over.
Plessy's lawyers then sued to prohibit the judge from proceeding with trial.
Thus the tide of the case was Plessy v. Ferguson, although the real party in
interest was Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court supported Fergu-
son and Plessy filed a writ of error.
20. See Transcript of Record, The State of Louisiana v. Homer Adolph Plessy
(Criminal District Court No. 19117) certified to Supreme Court of Louisiana in Ex
Parte Homer A. Plessy No. 11134, filed Nov. 26, 1892, Judgment of the district
court.
2007]
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Justice Brown devoted most of his opinion for the United States Su-
preme Court to arguments based on the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' He
recognized that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment was to establish
"absolute equality of the two races before the law," 22 but he distinguished
between social and political equality. He argued that school segregation
and anti-miscegenation laws received broad acceptance as instances of so-
cial separation in contrast to the denial of political rights exemplified by
the exclusion of African-Americans from juries, which the Supreme Court
had held invalid.23
Having established to his own satisfaction that racial separation was
constitutional with respect to civil as opposed to political rights, Justice
Brown turned to the question whether the state had the power to regulate
railroad seating in this case. He said that railroad charters or local laws
could prohibit the use of race in assigning seats on railroads, 24 but he
pointed out that the Court invalidated a Louisiana anti-discrimination law
that applied to interstate commerce in Hall v. DeCuir.2 5 Although Justice
Brown did not mention it, Hall assumed that if state anti-discrimination
laws could validly apply to interstate commerce, state segregation laws
could apply as well. 26 Justice Brown did note that the Court held a federal
public accommodations law invalid for supplanting state power over local
matters. 27 He reasoned that states had power to regulate railroad seating
in local commerce, and that racial separation could be required because it
was an issue of social rather than political equality.
Justice Brown then discussed Louisville, NO. & T Ry. Co. v. Missis-
sippi,28 which involved a Mississippi statute that required railroads to pro-
vide separate accommodations for the white and colored races.29 The
United States Supreme Court had held that the statute did not violate the
commerce clause because it was confined to accommodations for passen-
21. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1896) (dismissing arguments
summarily based on Thirteenth Amendment).
22. Id. at 544.
23. See id. at 544-45.
24. See id. at 546 (citing Railroad Company v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445 (1873)).
25. See id. at 546 (citing Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878)).
26. See Hall, 95 U.S. at 489 ("No carrier of passengers can conduct his busi-
ness with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side
of a State line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy
the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate.").
27. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546-47 (citing United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)).
28. 133 U.S. 587 (1890) (noting carefully that it was deciding only whether
separate car had to be provided, not whether state could require anyone to ride in
that car). Since the only injury was to the railroad in having to put an extra car on,
the sole question addressed by the Court was whether that burden violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 591-92. But see id. at 593 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that Mississippi statute was regulation of commerce forbidden
under Hall v. De Cuir).
29. See id. at 588.
[Vol. 52: p. 411
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gers traveling intrastate. 30 Justice Brown said the same was true of the
Louisiana statute in Plessy because the Supreme Court of Louisiana "held
that the statute in question did not apply to interstate passengers, but was
confined in its application to passengers traveling exclusively within the
borders of the State."'3 1 The train that Plessy took was "purely a local
line."3 2
At this point Justice Brown had laid out the basic reasoning in sup-
port of the segregation statute. He could have turned then to reply to the
specific points raised by counsel. Instead, he moved from reasoning to the
assertion of authority. Here, Justice Brown set forth the string citation
that is the focus of this article:
Similar statutes for the separation of the two races upon public
conveyances were held to be constitutional in West Chester &c.
Railroad v. Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209; Day v. Owen, 5 Michigan, 520;
Chicago &c. Railway v. Williams, 55 Illinois, 185; Chesapeake &c.
Railroad v. Wells, 85 Tennessee, 613; Memphis &c. Railroad v.
Benson, 85 Tennessee, 627; The Sue, 22 Fed. Rep. 843; Logwood
v. Memphis &c. Railroad, 23 Fed. Rep. 318; McGuinn v. Forbes,
37 Fed. Rep. 639; People v. King, 18 N.E. Rep. 245; Houck v.
South Pac. Railway, 38 Fed. Rep. 226; Heard v. Georgia Railroad
Co., 3 Int. Com. Com'n, 111; S.C., 1 Ibid. 428.33
This was a simple statement of fact regarding the holdings of twelve
cases-asserting that each of them held that statutes like Louisiana's segre-
gation law were constitutional. But the statement is false. Louisiana re-
quired trains to segregate and passengers to abide by segregation, but
none of the twelve cases cited involved a statutory requirement that pas-
sengers sit in segregated areas, and none challenged a law that required
segregation.
III. WHAT THE CASES REALLY HELD
Almost all of the cases in Plessy's string citation involved the common
law limits on a carrier's power to racially segregate its passengers. The first
three cases came from northern states. They established the principle that
a common carrier is obliged to carry all passengers but is allowed to sepa-
rate the races if the separate facilities are substantially equal. The next two
cases came from Tennessee, where an ambiguous state statute required
railroads to provide additional first class cars or areas for colored passen-
gers as an "anti-discrimination" measure. Arguably, the statute merely
codified the common law. The plaintiff in the first Tennessee case sought
to enforce the statute against the defendant, not to challenge it. Further,
30. See id.
31. Pessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49.
32. See id. at 548.
33. Id.
2007] 417
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the statute was inapplicable to the second case, which was based on gen-
der, not race.
The Court then cited four federal cases in order of their appearance
in the Federal Reports, interrupted by the citation of a state case. The
federal courts applied the separate if equal common law principle, but the
cases did not involve a challenge to a federal or state statute. The state
case challenged a New York statute that prohibited racial discrimination.
Two Interstate Commerce Commission decisions involving the same
parties ended the string citation. The Commission interpreted the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in light of the
common law principle to require equal accommodations if the races were
separated, but the Act did not require the separation.
A. The Development of the Common Law Obligation of Common Carriers:
From Reasonable to Separate If Equal
The core principle in the cases in the string citation was an American
derivation from the principle developed in the English common law. The
English principle arose to cope with problems of the Black Death and was
a departure from Roman law. The English courts ruled that common car-
riers must transport all persons who present themselves in a reasonable
manner if there is space. The master could reasonably decide where such
passengers would be located. American courts had to deal with this issue
in the context of widespread racial discrimination. Initially, they seemed
uncertain as to the requirements of reasonableness. After the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, American courts concluded that
carriers must transport all passengers willing to pay for first class passage
in substantially equal facilities although the carrier could separate the
races when it did so.
1. The Carrier's Obligation at Common Law
Innkeepers and carriers were often classed together in the Digest of
Justian. 34 Both professions were strictly liable for injury to their cus-
tomer's property unless they obtained a waiver. 35 Thus Roman law indi-
cated a common understanding about innkeepers and carriers, and a
34. See 1-4 THE DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN (Theodor Mommsen & Alan Watson eds.,
1985) (codifying Roman law); DIG. 4.9 and DIG. 47.5.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 38)
are devoted to actions against innkeepers and ship's masters.
35. See DIG. 4.9.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 14) ("The praetor says: 'I will give an
action against seamen, innkeepers, and stablekeepers in respect of what they have
received and undertaken to keep safe, unless they restore it.'"); see also DIG. 4.9.1.8.
Moreover does the 'seaman' accept goods and undertake that they will be
safe only where the goods on being sent to the ship have been handed
over to him, or is he held to have received the goods even if they have not
been handed over, because they have been sent to the ship? And I think
that he receives for safekeeping all the goods which have been brought
onto the ship and that he ought to be liable for the acts not only of the
crew but also of the passengers ....
418 [Vol. 52: p. 411
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concern for protecting the property of the lodger or passenger. The Di-
gest justified the presumptive strict liability by a purported right to reject
customers, 3 6 although that was a poor justification, and the right to reject
itself may have been only speculation.3 7
English common law developed somewhat differently, requiring inn-
keepers to accept all who sought shelter. This obligation initially arose as
an incident of the protection of lodgers from theft during the dislocation
that followed the Black Death. The duty precluded innkeepers from com-
pelling lodgers to waive their rights as a condition of gaining a room. 38
The common carrier obligation to accept all passengers was an extension
from the common law obligation of innkeepers. 39 It may have developed
from a similar fear that carriers would reject passengers in order to coerce
a waiver of liability for loss and injury. 40 As the economy developed, the
courts permitted businesses to contract out of their liability, but they did
not release the carrier from its obligation to accept passengers. By the
nineteenth century, it was a well-established feature of the common law
that a carrier must accept all passengers, but how the carrier should treat
the passenger was still open for debate.
The first three cases cited by the Court in Plessy exemplify a common
law progression in state courts in the United States. The first case permit-
ted racial discrimination as a reasonable act of the carrier, but the later
decisions insisted upon equality of accommodations if the carrier chose to
separate the passengers. The first two cases reflected the belief that racial
separation was a good idea, but they arose before the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and legislatures in those states repudiated segre-
gation long before Plessy was decided. None of these cases faced the issue
whether states could constitutionally command separation of the races.
Id.; DIG. 4.9.2 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Prouinciale) ("U]ust as an innkeeper is liable
for the acts of travelers."); DIG. 4.9.3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum) ("[Pomponius] says
that even if the goods have not yet been received on the ship but have been lost on
shore, once the 'seaman' has received them the risk is with him."); DIG. 4.9.3.1
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum) ("Hence, Labeo writes that if anything is lost through ship-
wreck or an attack by pirates, it is not unfair that a defense be given to the 'sea-
man.' The same must be said if an act of vis maior occurs in a stable or inn.").
36. See DIG. 4.9.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 14) ("Let no one think that the obliga-
tion placed on them is too strict; for it is in their own discretion whether to receive
anyone .. ").
37. See David S. Bogen, Ignoring History: The Liability of Ship's Masters, Innkeepers
and Stablekeepers Under Roman Law, AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 326, 332-60 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Ignoring History].
38. See David S. Bogen, The Innkeeper's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public
Calling, 1996 UTAH L. Rv. 51, 86 (1996) [hereinafter Innkeeper's Tale] (addressing
innkeeper's "duty to serve the public").
39. See generallyJackson v. Rogers, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (1693) (analogizing com-
mon carrier's failure to carry goods to innkeeper's duty to accept guests).
40. See Bogen, Innkeepers Tale, supra note 38, at 54, 85-86 (noting that "liability
was based on status rather than agreement.").
2007]
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2. Day v. Owen (1858)
In Day v. Owen,41 an African-American passenger sued a Michigan
steamship company owner prior to the Civil War for refusing to carry him
in a cabin on the boat. The Supreme Court of Michigan applied the gen-
eral common law rule that the defendant could not refuse to carry the
plaintiff without a good excuse. The Court, however, said that "the accom-
modation of passengers, while being transported, is subject to such rules
and regulations as the carrier may think proper to make, provided they be
reasonable." 42 In other words, passengers had a right to be carried, but
carriers had a right to tell them where to be on the boat.
The Michigan Court held that the carrier could act to promote the
"community at large" and, in doing so, could exclude the plaintiff from
the cabins as long as it was willing to carry him on deck.43 Thus, the court
did not require equality, but permitted the carrier to discriminate to sat-
isfy the desires of the majority of its passengers.4 4
Day was no longer precedent in Michigan when the Court decided
Plessy. The state had enacted a public accommodations law in 1885 that
required equal treatment without regard to color. William Ferguson sued
Gies European Restaurant for refusing to serve him on the restaurant side
as opposed to the saloon side of the premises. The trial court charged the
jury that the law was satisfied by separate facilities that were equal in com-
fort, citing several common carrier cases including Day.4 5 The Supreme
Court of Michigan reversed, saying:
In Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, this same principle was recognized;
but it must be remembered that the decision,... was made in the
41. 5 Mich. 520 (1858).
42. See id. at 525-26.
43. Id. at 528. The Court in Day noted:
It states defendant refused to carry the plaintiff in the cabin, and not that
he refused to carry him generally, and seems to admit the carrying of
passengers in other parts of the boat as well as in the cabin, and therefore
does not make out a case of refusal to carry generally.
Id.
44. See id. at 527. The court explained:
[The law] does not require a carrier to make any rules whatever, but if he
deems it for his interest to do so, looking to an increase of passengers
from the superior accommodations he holds out to the public, to deny
him the right would be an interference with a carrier's control over his
own property in his own way, not necessary to the performance of his
duty to the public as a carrier.
Id.
45. See Paul Finkelman, The Surprising History of Race and Law in Michigan,
MICH. SUPREME COURT HIsToRicAL Soc'Y, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.micourthis-
tory.org/news-events/FinkelmanVignette.htm (describing legal history of race re-
lations in nineteenth and early twentieth century Michigan). William Ferguson
was a businessman who became Michigan's first African-American legislator. Id.
His attorney, D. Augustus Straker, had been a legislator in South Carolina and was
the first African-American judicial officer in Michigan. Id.
420 [Vol. 52: p. 411
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ante bellum days, before the colored man was a citizen, and when,
in nearly one-half of the Union, he was but a chattel. It cannot
now serve as a precedent.
46
3. The West Chester & Philadelphia R.R. Co. v. Miles (1867)
After the Civil War, state courts permitted carriers to separate the
races, but they began to insist that carriers afford black passengers first
class accommodations. The most prominent case announcing the com-
mon law rule was The West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Company v.
Miles,47 an 1867 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision.
The plaintiff, Mary Miles, was forced to leave the train because she
refused to move from her seat in the middle of the car to go to the rear of
the carriage as the railroad rules required for persons of color. The de-
fendants requested the trial judge to charge the jury: "If the jury find that
the seat which the plaintiff was directed to take, was in all respects a com-
fortable, safe and convenient seat, not inferior in any respect to the one
she was directed to leave, she cannot recover."4 8 The trial court rejected
this request. It charged the jury instead that defendants could not make
her change her seat simply because of color, and Ms. Miles won at trial.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the judgment, echoing the
views of Day: "The right of the PASSENGER is only that of being carried
safely, and with a due regard to his personal comfort and convenience,
which are promoted by a sound and well-regulated separation of PASSEN-
GERS." 4 9 The court insisted that, "a guest in an inn cannot select his room
or his bed at pleasure; nor can a voyager take possession of a cabin or a
berth at will, or refuse to obey the reasonable orders of the captain of a
vessel." 50
Justice Daniel Agnew's opinion for the court said that the carrier
must act reasonably, but he found that segregation was reasonable:
When, therefore, we declare a right to maintain separate rela-
tions, as far as is reasonably practicable, but in a spirit of kindness
and charity, and with due regard to equality of rights, it is not
prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to suf-
fer men to follow the law of races established by the Creator him-
self, and not to compel them to intermix contrary to their
instincts. 5 1
46. Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 363-64 (1890) (emphasis added).
47. 55 Pa. 209 (1867).
48. Id. at 209.
49. Id. at 212.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 214. Judge Allan B. Morse said of this passage from Agnew's opin-
ion in West Chester "This reasoning does not commend itself either to the heart or
judgment." Ferguson, 82 Mich. at 366.
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In other words, the common law obligations of carriers required them
to take passengers regardless of color, but did not prevent the carrier from
separating the races when seating them. Justice Agnew's opinion accepted
racial distinctions completely, referring to the "natural law which forbids
their intermarriage."
52
Although a Philadelphia court in 1861 held that excluding negroes
from riding inside passenger cars was reasonable, such discrimination was
unacceptable after the Civil War.53 In 1865 another judge of the Philadel-
phia court found ejection from a streetcar because of race was actiona-
ble.54 Chief Justice Taney had stated in Dred Scott that African-Americans
were not citizens of the United States. 55 But the war resulted in a repudia-
tion of his opinion by both statute and constitutional amendment. Sec-
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided: "That all persons born in
the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians
not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States .... "56
The Fourteenth Amendment also began with the acknowledgment of citi-
zenship for all persons born in the United States. Although the Four-
teenth Amendment did not apply directly to private entities, it evidenced
the postbellum societal understanding that racial discrimination was not
"reasonable" behavior.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in West Chester spoke of "due
regard to equality of rights," and the requested charge referred to a seat
"not inferior in any respect to the one she was directed to leave." 5 7 This
portion of the opinion was part of the basis for generating a rule of "sepa-
rate but equal" in the common law. Other state courts expressly used the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to demonstrate that the status
of the negro had changed and that racial discrimination in transportation
could no longer be justified.58
52. See West Chester, 55 Pa. at 213 (discussing grounds for separation of races
based on natural law).
53. See Goines v. M'Candless, 4 Phila. Reports 255, 257-58 (1861) (concluding
regulation was wise and entering judgment for defendant).
54. See Derry v. Lowry, 6 Phila. Reports 30, 32 (1865) (finding carriers could
not exclude any class of persons based on race). The court explained:
The logic of events of the past four years has in many respects cleared our
vision and corrected our judgment; and no proposition has been more
clearly wrought out by them than that the men who have been deemed
worthy, to become the defenders of the country, to wear the uniforms of
the soldier of the United States, should not be denied the fights common
to humanity. ...
Id. at 33.
55. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857), (finding that African-
Americans not intended to be included as citizens under Constitution), superseded
by Constitutional Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27, 27-30.
57. West Chester, 55 Pa. at 211, 214.
58. See Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 364 (1890) ("The negro is now, by the
Constitution of the United States, given full citizenship with the white man, and all
the rights and privileges of citizenship attend him wherever he goes."). See generally
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Justice Agnew may have thought public transport segregation laws
would be appropriate, but he did not have such a statute before him in the
case. In discussing the propriety of the carrier's decision, he noted that
schools in Pennsylvania were racially separated when there were sufficient
students to do so and that military units were also segregated. He cited an
1838 decision of the Pennsylvania Court that held, analogously to Dred
Scott,59 that the status of "negro" was not recognized as a "freeman" under
Pennsylvania's Constitution, and therefore negroes were not citizens of
the state. Thus, Justice Agnew spoke of the law as sanctioning the differ-
ences in the races: "Law and custom having sanctioned a separation of
races, it is not the province of the judiciary to legislate it away." 60 Law and
custom, however, did not support separation when he decided the case.
An 1867 Pennsylvania statute prohibited railroad companies from making
any distinction on account of race or color.6 1 Agnew avoided the impact
of the statute by arguing that the enactment after Ms. Miles's expulsion
demonstrated that the legislature believed the railroad's behavior was law-
ful when it took place. 62
In sum, Justice Agnew's references to pre-Amendment laws unrelated
to common carriers did not justify Justice Brown's statement that West
Chester held statutes requiring transport segregation constitutional. The
constitutionality of such a statute was never raised or directly commented
upon in the opinion, because no such statute existed in Pennsylvania. In-
deed, the only statute in the case pointed in the opposite direction.
4. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams (1870)
The next major case that the Court cited in Plessy made it clear that
the common law required equality in seating. Anna Williams sued the
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company claiming that they refused to
David S. Bogen, Precursors to Rosa Parks: Maryland Transportation Cases Between the
Civil War and the Beginning of World War 1, 63 MD. L. REv. 721 (2004) (discussing
Judge Giles' use of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply common law rules in
Baltimore streetcar cases).
59. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (stating that negroes were not citizens under
Constitution).
60. West Chester, 55 Pa. at 214-15.
61. See Cent. Ry. Co. of N.J. v. Green, 86 Pa. 427, 430-32 (1878) (discussing
statute prohibiting railroad from refusing to allow passenger to use particular car
on grounds of race). But see Benjamin H. Hunt, Why Segregation in Postwar Philadel-
phia, in THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION 95, 95-96 (Joel Williamson ed., D.C. Heath
and Co. 1968) (discussing state of segregated railroad cars and ejection of passen-
gers based on race). See generally Philip S. Foner, The Battle to End Discrimination
Against Negroes on Philadelphia Streetcars (pts. 1 & 2), 40 PA. HISTORY 237, 261-90
(July 1973), 40 PA. HISTORY 351, 355-79 (Oct. 1973).
62. See West Chester, 55 Pa. at 215 (finding Act that arose after West Chester was
"indication of the legislative understanding of the law as it stood before the pas-
sage of the act").
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allow her to sit in the ladies car because of her color.63 The Illinois Su-
preme Court noted that the company had not promulgated any rule other
than separation of the genders, and therefore her exclusion was unreason-
able. Nevertheless, the court went on to discuss whether a color-based
rule would be lawful. It cited West Chester as saying that separate seating
that was equally safe and comfortable was reasonable. The Illinois Court
suggested in dicta that "[u] nder some circumstances, this might not be an
unreasonable rule." 64 The Court then continued, however: "At all events,
public carriers, until they do furnish separate seats equal in comfort and
safety to those furnished for other travelers, must be held to have no right
to discriminate between passengers on account of color, race or nativity,
alone."65
In short, the three state cases cited by the Court demonstrated that
common carriers had at one time segregated passengers in the north and
that such segregation did not violate the common law. But two of the
cases involved events that preceded passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the last case only speculated as to whether separation was per-
missible. Moreover, since the Fourteenth Amendment only forbids state
behavior, it did not directly apply to the right of a private carrier to dis-
criminate, which was the only issue involved in the cases.6 6 Since none of
the first three cases cited by the Court in Plessy involved a state law requir-
ing separation of the races or held that such a law would be constitutional,
the Court's assertion that they did was false.
B. The Common Law Principle Applied in the Context of an
Ambiguous Statute
The next two cases cited by the Court came from Tennessee, which
has been said to have passed the first Jim Crow law. 67 The common law
principle insisted that carriers afford black and white passengers seats
equal in comfort and safety, but equality posed economic problems for
racial separation. For example, railroads often had only two cars-a non-
smoking "ladies car" reserved for ladies and the men who accompanied
them, and a second car for all others where smoking was permitted. Rail-
roads often excluded black passengers from the ladies car unless accompa-
nying a white woman in a domestic capacity. Since smoking and
nonsmoking cars are not equal, strict segregation could force railroads to
63. See Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, 186-87 (1870) (discussing
facts of case).
64. Id. at 189.
65. Id.
66. For a discussion of how the Fourteenth Amendment could, however, be
used in reasoning about the reasonableness of decisions by private persons, see
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1388 (1996) (stating that Tennessee passed
firstJim Crow law in 1881).
[Vol. 52: p. 411
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/1
PLESSVS STRING CITATION
add a third car for African American women, though the traffic did not
justify it.
1. The Tennessee Statute
To avoid the common law requirements, Tennessee passed a statute
in 1875 to eliminate the common carrier's obligation.68 The purpose of
the statute was to enable common carriers to discriminate, but it was per-
missive rather than obligatory. It did not preclude actions brought on the
basis of breach of contract, 69 nor did it apply to interstate transport. 70
Further, Congress enacted the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, which re-
quired "equal enjoyment of the accommodations... of inns [and] public
conveyances on land or water... subject only to the conditions and limita-
tions established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color ... "71 Although some courts interpreted the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1875 to permit segregation on common carriers where the seats
were equally comfortable, the Act still provided a basis for suit. 72 Thus,
the 1875 Tennessee statute did not prevent litigation, but led plaintiffs to
assert their rights in federal court. 7
3
68. See Act of Mar. 23, 1875, ch. 130, 1875 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1) ("[T]he rule of
the Common Law giving a right of action to any person excluded from any Hotel
or public means of transportation or place of amusement, is hereby
abrogated .. ").
69. See, e.g., Transcript of Case at 6, Wells v. Chesapeake Ohio and Sw. Ry. Co.,
No. 8130 (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Tenn. Mar. 31, 1885) (stating Plaintiff's breach
of contract cause of action).
70. See Brown v. Memphis & C.R. Co., 5 F. 499, 501 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880)
(citing Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877)). In Brown, Judge Hammond charged
the jury that the statute could not deprive the plaintiff of the common law right of
action on an interstate journey because that would interfere with congressional
power over commerce. Id.
71. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §1, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (2003).
72. SeeGreen v. City of Bridgeton, 10 F. Cas. 1090, 1093 (S.D. Ga. 1879) (find-
ing colored passengers of steamboat were entitled to separate but equally suitable
accommodations as white passengers); United States v. Dodge, 25 F. Cas. 882, 883
(W.D. Tex. 1877) (concluding that defendant would not be liable for prosecution
when colored passenger was only allowed in one railway car if cars were equally
fit); Charge to Grand Jury-Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1001 (C.C.W.D.N.C.
1875) (stating that both races are entitled to "convenient and comfortable accom-
modations in inns and public conveyances"); Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career
of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28
Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 17, 32-33 (1984) (discussing federal judges use of "separate but
equal" doctrine).
73. Litigants in federal court often sued under the common law of carriers or
contracts rather than the Civil Rights Act in order to avoid the damage limitations.
See Kenneth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South:
Travel and Segregation on Tennessee Railroads, 1875-1905, 24 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 377,
385 (1999) (noting that Civil Rights Act limited damages to $500, while many
blacks sued for thousands of dollars under common law). They may also have
avoided the Civil Rights Act because shortly after its enactment a federal judge
(Emmons) had charged a grand jury in Tennessee that it was unconstitutional. See
Charge to Grand Jury-Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005, 1006 (C.C.W.D. Tenn.
20071 425
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Although an attempted repeal of the state statute failed,"4 the Ten-
nessee legislature did pass a related penal statute in 1881. The preamble
explained the statute's design as an anti-discrimination measure to ensure
equality in first class cars.7 5 The preamble stated:
WHEREAS, it is the practice of railroad companies located and
operated in the State of Tennessee to charge and collect from
colored passengers traveling over their roads first class passage
fare, and compel said passengers to occupy second class cars
where smoking is allowed, and no restrictions enforced to pre-
vent vulgar or obscene language; therefore .... 76
The 1881 Tennessee statute commanded railroads to furnish "sepa-
rate cars," but it was ambiguous on whether it compelled segregation:
77
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennes-
see, That all railroad companies located and operated in this State
shall furnish separate cars, or portions of cars cut off by partition
walls, in which all colored passengers who pay first class passen-
ger rates of fare, may have the privilege to enter and occupy, and
such apartments shall be kept in good repair, and with the same
conveniences, and subject to the same rules governing other first
class cars, preventing smoking and obscene language.
78
1875) (concluding that Thirteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress's reg-
ulation of private inns and common carriers in Act). Nevertheless, one of the
federal litigants was Sally Robinson, whose case was among those consolidated in
the Civil Rights Act Cases. See Civil Rights Act Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883) (dis-
cussing Robinson's case). In addition to the deterrence of unsympathetic courts,
individuals who tested compliance with the act in Nashville in 1875 were likely to
lose their jobs. See HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH,
1865-1890 196, 391 n.63 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (explaining case of twelve
blacks who tested compliance to Civil Rights Act and impact of economic
retaliation).
74. See StanleyJ. Folmsbee, The Origin of the First 'Jim Crow" Law, 15J. S. LEGAL
HIsT. 235, 238 (1949) (citing Tennessee General Assembly, House Journal, at 540
(1881)) (stating that Negro legislators did not "secure enough Republican votes to
defeat the law").
75. See CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION
OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT 209 n.17 (William E. Leuchtenburg ed., Columbia Univ.
Press 1983) (discussing intent of 1881 Act as anti-discrimination law). The title of
the Act in the Laws of Tennessee was "An Act to prevent discrimination by railroad
companies among passengers who are charged and paying first class passage, and
fixing penalty for the violation same." Act of April 7, 1881, ch. 156, 1881 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 211, 211 (amended 1882).
76. Id.
77. See Mack, supra note 73, at 384 (explaining that 1881 statute was ambigu-
ous when it required railroads to provide separate cars for first-class black
passengers).
78. Act of April 7, 1881, ch. 156, 1881 Tenn. Pub. Acts 211, 211 (amended
1882).
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Although colored passengers were to have a first class area where they
could go, the statute did not say that whites should have an area from
which colored passengers would be excluded. The statute provided that
separate areas must exist in which colored passengers may have the privi-
lege to enter and occupy, but it did not require colored passengers to ride
in such cars or railroads to force them to occupy them. It referred to the
smoking car as a "second class" car, and the smoker, regardless of race,
might prefer to stay in the "second class" car where he could smoke. The
statute stated its purpose to deal with the railroads' practice of compelling
colored passengers to occupy second class cars. If the railroad allowed
colored passengers to occupy first class cars in which whites were present,
it could argue that it satisfied the purpose of the statute. Perhaps the stat-
ute merely required railroads to provide first class cars to which colored
passengers would have access separate from smoking cars, leaving it to the
railroad to determine whether the races would be separated.
The ambiguity of the 1881 statute was exacerbated by an amendment
in 1882 that did not mention separate cars but provided:
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennes-
see, That all persons who purchase tickets, and pay therefore first-
class passenger rates, shall be entitled to enter and occupy first-
class passenger cars, and it shall be the duty of all railroad compa-
nies located and operated in this State to furnish such passen-
gers, accommodations equal in all respects in comfort and
convenience to the first-class cars on the train, and subject to the
same rules governing other first-class cars.
79
The Amendment repealed much of the 1881 act that conflicted, but
the "separate car" requirement of the earlier statute did not necessarily
conflict. There were no decisions on the necessity for a separate car, be-
cause railroads were not sued when they permitted colored passengers to
ride in first class cars with whites. In light of the race-neutral 1882 Amend-
ment, it seems appropriate to read the statute to permit railroads to pro-
vide separate first class accommodations for the races, but not to require
separation.80 The state statute became particularly important when the
79. Act of May 22, 1882, ch. 6, 1882 Tenn. Pub. Acts 12; see also Mack, supra
note 73, at 384 (discussing 1882 amendment).
80. See Mack, supra note 73, at 384 (finding that 1882 amendment did not
require segregation on its face). "Separate cars or portions of cars set off by parti-
tion walls" strongly suggests racial separation, and "other first class cars" suggests a
distinction between the required cars and the existing first class cars that had been
restricted to whites only. Compare Act of May 22, 1882, ch. 6, 1882 Tenn. Pub. Acts
12 (implying separate accommodations are not required in railroad cars), with Act
of April 7, 1881, ch. 156, 1881 Tenn. Pub. Acts 211, 211-12 (requiring separate
accommodations in railroad cars). For a discussion of howJudge Pierce's opinion
suggests that racial separation was required by the statute, see infra notes 86-87 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, at least one treatise writer believed that the Ten-
nessee statute merely reflected the common law principle, permitting segregation
where there were comparable facilities, but not requiring it. See ROBERT HUTCHIN-
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United States Supreme Court held the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional in
1883.81 That left plaintiffs in Tennessee to their recourse under state laws.
2. Chesapeake, Ohio & Sw. R.R. v. Wells (1887)
On September 15, 1883, Ida B. Wells was ejected from the ladies car
of the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern Railroad when she attempted
to go from Memphis to Woodstock, Tennessee. She brought suit for
breach of contract.8 2 The defendant demurred on the grounds that it had
invited her to occupy a different first class coach, that it had a statutory
right to designate a separate car, that the statute established a penalty in
lieu of damages, and that there was no contention the other car was not
equal. 83
A few days after the railroad entered its plea, her attorney, Thomas
Cassils, told Ida Wells that the railroad ticket agent said she would not be
forced from the ladies car again. Nevertheless, when she boarded the
train in Woodstock heading for Memphis on May 4, 1884, the conductor
barred her from entering the car for whites. He stopped the train next to
the station and she got off rather than proceed in the colored car. She
brought suit again. 84 Justice of the Peace John Elliott initially found for
Ms. Wells in the amount of $200. The case then went to Circuit Judge
Pierce virtually simultaneously with the first case for a decision on an
agreed statement of facts. 85
In the first case, Judge James Pierce found that the same cars were
used by white passengers in one direction and black passengers in the
other, but that white passengers considered the car for colored passengers
to be one for smoking and drinking and the railway had not succeeded in
preventing such behavior despite some attempts by the conductor. Judge
Pierce held "she was thereby refused the first class accommodations to
which she was entitled under the law. The policy of Tennessee upon this
subject has been embodied in statutes." 86 He awarded her $500 in dam-
ages on December 27, 1884, explaining:
A classification of its passengers by a railroad company, so as to
separate the races, is not only within discretion because its pa-
trons may so desire, but is required by the statutes before cited.
The plaintiff's case, however, does not rest upon an objection to
SON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS 618-19 (Floyd R. Mechem ed., Callaghan
& Co. 2d ed. 1891) (contrasting permissive nature of Tennessee's statute with Mis-
sissippi's requirement).
81. See Civil Rights Act Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (declaring Civil Rights Act
void as unauthorized by Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment).
82. See Transcript of Case at 4-7, Wells v. Chesapeake Ohio & Sw. Ry. Co., No.
8130 (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Tenn. Mar. 31, 1885).
83. See id. at 7-10.
84. See id. at 4-7.
85. See id. at 7.
86. See id. at 64.
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this classification. The wrong complained of is the failure to fur-
nish with the classification, accommodations for the colored pas-
sengers equal to those accorded to the white passengers.
8 7
In the second case, Ms. Wells claimed that someone was smoking in
the front car, however, this contention was denied by another deponent.
Despite this disagreement, both parties agreed that smoking sometimes
occurred in the front car but never in the rear car.8 8 In December of 1884
the Court entered judgment for Ms. Wells for $200.89
Ida Wells claimed a right to sit where she wanted because her ticket
did not preclude her from doing so. The common law, however, offered
little support for that argument. The conductor had the power to tell pas-
sengers where to sit, subject only to limits set by the common law and the
statute. Since Tennessee's statute in 1875 changed the common law, Wells
had to rely on the 1882 statute to succeed in her suit. Instead of attacking
the statute, her lawyers relied upon it to provide the basis for recovery for
unequal treatment. Wells sued on the grounds that the Railroad failed to
provide equal facilities as required by law but decided not to challenge the
statute itself.90
On appeal, her lawyer argued: "Accepting, therefore, the proposition
of law that a common carrier has the right to separate passengers because
of race, where it provides equal accommodation, we claim that under the
facts of the case at bar we must recover."9 1 While the accommodations
were physically equal, the allowance of smoking in the car not reserved for
whites and the absence of white women from that car demonstrated that it
87. Id. at 68.
88. See id. at 11-12.
89. See id. at 15. The victory inspired her to write about the case that led to
her subsequent career as a crusading journalist, who later became especially fa-
mous for her fight against lynching. See generally IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUS-
TICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS (1970).
90. Wells's lawyer, Thomas F. Cassels, was a representative when the 1881 bill
was passed. He had abstained in that vote although two other black representa-
tives voted against it. SeeJOSEPH H. CARTWRIGHT, THE TRIUMPH OF JIM CROW: TEN-
NESSEE RACE RELATIONS IN THE 1880s 104 (1976) (citingJoURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIES OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 993 (Nashville: Tavel & Howell
1881)). Cassels asked Judge Thomas Greer to join him on the case. Wells was
concerned that Cassells was not pressing her case and she replaced him with Greer
as lead attorney in the second case and on appeal. See also LINDA 0. McMuRRY, To
KEEP THE WATERS TROUBLED: THE LIFE OF IDA B. WELLS 27-28 (1998); THE MEMPHIS
DIARY OF IDA B. WELLS 56-57 (Miriam DeCosta-Willis eds., 1995) [hereinafter MEM-
PHIs.DIARY].
91. Brief of Greer & Adams for Defendant in Error at 4, Chesapeake Ohio &
Sw. Ry. Co. v. Ida Wells, 85 Tenn. 613 (1885). Since the railroad was a private
carrier, which could not be compelled to refrain from segregating by the federal
government, only a state statute or the common law obligations of carriers could
provide a basis for suit. Invalidation of the 1881 statute could leave the 1875 Ten-
nessee statute in place with respect to wholly intrastate operations, and that law
abrogated the common law obligation and left the railroad free to discriminate on
its own.
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was not equal. If the cars were truly equal, white women would be indiffer-
ent as to which car they rode in.
Ignoring Ms. Wells's testimony and Judge Pierce's findings on smok-
ing and drinking enforcement, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Chesa-
peake, Ohio & Southwestern Railroad v. WellS92 reversed the award in her
favor: "Having offered, as the statute provides, 'accommodations equal in
all respects in comfort and convenience to the first-class cars on the train,
and subject to the rules governing other first-class cars,' the company had
done all that could rightfully be demanded."9 3
The Court said that she was attempting to create a test case, and they
would have none of it.9 4 The opinion did not examine the constitutional-
ity of the statute, but simply assumed it. Nothing in the case turned on
whether the statute required segregation or merely permitted carriers to
engage in it, thus, the issue was not discussed by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee.
3. Memphis & Charleston R.R. v. Benson (1887)
Later that term, in Memphis & Charleston Railroad v. Benson,9 5 the
Court in an opinion by Justice Horace Lurton 96 characterized its decision
in Wells without any statutory reference, saying that Wells held:
[T] hat a railway company may make reasonable regulations con-
cerning the car in which a passenger might be required to ride,
provided that equal accommodations were furnished to all hold-
ing first-class tickets, and that a regulation assigning a particular
car to persons of color, that car being in all respects equal in
comfort to any other in the train, was reasonable. 9 7
Justice Lurton cited West Chester and Williams in support of this pro-
position, both of which were common law carrier obligation cases with no
statutory issue:9
8
92. 85 Tenn. 613 (1887).
93. Id. Ms. Wells expressed her feelings regarding the judgment when she
stated:
I felt so disappointed, because I had hoped such great things from my
suit for my people generally. I have firmly believed all along that the law
was on our side and would, when we appealed to it, give us justice. I feel
shorn of that belief and utterly discouraged....
MEMPHIS DIARY, supra note 90, at 140-41.
94. See Wells, 85 Tenn. at 615 ("We think it is evident the purpose of the de-
fendant in error was to harass with a view to this suit, and that her persistence was
not in good faith to obtain a comfortable seat for the short ride.").
95. 85 Tenn. 627 (1887).
96. Horace Lurton was subsequently appointed to the United States Supreme
Court in 1910.
97. Benson, 85 Tenn. at 631.
98. See id.
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A passenger may not dictate where he will sit, or in which car he
will ride. If he is furnished accommodations equal in all respects
to those furnished other passengers on the same train, he cannot
complain; and this was the substance of our decision in the Wells
case. The doctrine is equally applicable here.9"
Benson did not raise issues of race, and the statute did not cover
them. He was evidently a nonsmoking man and refused to buy a ticket
unless afforded a seat in the ladies car where smoking was prohibited. On
its facts, the decision certainly did not hold anything relating to a racial
statute, nor did the opinion even mention a statute. Its approving refer-
ence to Wells goes no further than the case itself, and suggests that the case
merely accepted the common law limits on carrier discretion.
In short, of the five stated cases Justice Brown cited, only Wells in-
volved a state statute that arguably compelled segregation. The decisions
below awarded damages to Ida Wells on the basis of a violation of the
statute. Thus, the decision of the Tennessee Court reversing the lower
courts was premised on finding that she was treated equally. The short
opinion in that case, however, did not determine whether the statute was
obligatory or permissive, and it made no reference to constitutional issues.
Because there was no challenge to the Tennessee statute, the Court was
wrong to state that these cases held that a statute requiring segregation
was constitutional.
C. The Common Law Principle Applied in Federal Courts
The string cite in Plessy included four cases from lower federal courts.
The two federal court cases out of Maryland regarded libels in admiralty
against steamships. In those cases, the court held that steamships were
required to provide equal accommodations, but may be permitted to seg-
regate. In the other two cases, plaintiffs sued railroads in federal court
under diversity of citizenship. In those cases the federal court applied the
general rule of common carriers that prohibited exclusion of prospective
passengers but permitted separation of the races.
1. The Sue (1885)
In The Sue,10 0 Martha Stewart and her sisters, Lucy, Margaret and
Winnie, sued for damages because the steamship management prevented
them from sleeping in the rear sleeping cabin for women. The four wo-
men had first class tickets and were seated in the first class parlor with all
other first class passengers but had not purchased individual cabins. The
ship took the position that the communal sleeping areas could appropri-
ately be divided by race and by gender. The captain argued that the sleep-
ing quarters in the front of the boat for colored women were equally as
99. Id.
100. 22 F. 843 (1885).
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good as those for white women in the stern and, therefore, the sisters had
been afforded all their rights. The Court said that "under some circum-
stances, such a separation is allowable at common law." 10 1 Judge Thomas
Morris, however, found that in this case, the plaintiffs demonstrated that
their alternatives were not equally good and thus the separation violated
the obligation of the steamship as a common carrier on water.
Far from being a case of holding a statute constitutional, Judge
Thomas Morris said:
[T] he regulations... by which colored passengers are assigned to
a different sleeping cabin from white passengers, is a matter af-
fecting interstate commerce. It is, therefore, a matter which cannot be
regulated by state law, and congress having refrained from legisla-
tion on the subject, the owners of the boat are left at liberty to
adopt in reference thereto such reasonable regulations as the
common law allows. 10 2
Carrier regulations would not be reasonable unless the first class
colored passenger had first class accommodations equivalent to the stan-
dard of the other first class cabins. Judge Morris insisted that carriers must
integrate their accommodations if they cannot provide perfectly equal fa-
cilities: "On many vehicles for passenger transportation, the separation
cannot be lawfully made, and the right of steam-boat owners to make it
depends on their ability to make it without discrimination as to comfort,
convenience, or safety." 10 3
2. Logwood v. Memphis & C. R.R. Co. (1885)
Judge Morris's decision was read to the jury as part of the charge
given in Logwood v. Memphis & Central Railroad Co.10 4 In Logwood, the par-
ties agreed that ordinarily railroad carriers seated respectable African-
American women in the ladies car if they requested-and had done so
previously for Mrs. Logwood. On this occasion, Mrs. Logwood sued be-
cause she was required to sit in the front car. The conductor insisted that
he asked her to sit there temporarily and would have seated her in the
ladies car as soon as he had finished his other duties. The court's charge
in part dealt with the factual dispute, but it also noted that segregation
would be permissible if the accommodations were equal. However, Judge
Eli Shelby Hammond in Logwood insisted that "[e]qual accommodations
do not mean identical accommodations."1 0 5 Judge Hammond explained:
101. Id. at 845.
102. Id. at 844 (emphasis added) (citing Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877)).
103. Id. at 848.
104. 23 F. 318 (1885).
105. Id. at 319. Hammond was an ex-confederate soldier appointed to the
Western District for Tennessee in 1878 by President Rutherford Hayes to promote
conciliation.
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Common carriers are required by law not to make any unjust dis-
crimination, and must treat all passengers paying the same price
alike. Equal accommodations do not mean identical accommoda-
tions. Races and nationalities, under some circumstances, to be
determined on the facts of each case, may be reasonably sepa-
rated; but in all cases the carrier must furnish substantially the
same accommodations to all, by providing equal comforts, privi-
leges, and pleasures to every class. 10 6
Although Logwood was decided in Tennessee, Mrs. Logwood was trav-
eling interstate between Huntsville, Alabama and Courtland, Tennessee.
Judge Hammond's charge quoted the opinion in Sue, which referred to
the common law standard while specifically repudiating any state power to
regulate steamships traveling in interstate commerce.' 0 7 Judge Ham-
mond himself had previously held the 1875 Tennessee statute invalid as an
improper regulation of interstate commerce.10 8 Thus, Judge Hammond's
Logwood charge was directed to the common law rule and did not involve
any statute.
3. McGuinn v. Forbes (1889)
The cases through 1887 established the proposition that common car-
riers could segregate as long as they provided substantially equal facilities
to members of different races. In many of these cases, African American
plaintiffs prevailed by demonstrating that the facilities were not equal. In
McGuinn v. Forbes,10 9 the plaintiff's attorney argued that separation was
inherently unequal. While aboard the steamboat Mason Weems, Rever-
end Robert McGuinn sat down at a dining table occupied by white passen-
gers. When the passengers protested, the captain asked McGuinn to
move. When he refused, the captain told the white passengers they could
move to the table reserved for blacks if they wished to avoid McGuinn's
presence, which they did. Reverend McGuinn sued the Steamship owners,
but was prohibited from arguing inequality in facilities because he was
seated at the table reserved for white passengers. Instead, his counsel, Ev-
erett Waring, argued that separate was inherently unequal. 110 That argu-
ment proved to be ahead of its time, and the federal courts held that
McGuinn failed to show any inequality. Like the Steamer Sue case before
106. Id.
107. The Sue, 22 F. at 844 ("[T]he regulations made by her owners and en-
forced on board of her, by which colored passengers are assigned to a different
sleeping cabin from white passengers, is a matter affecting interstate commerce. It
is, therefore, a matter which cannot be regulated by state law.").
108. See Brown v. Memphis & C.R. Co., 5 F. 499, 501 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880).
109. 37 F. 639 (D. Md. 1889).
110. Brief of Libellant at 6, McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639 (4th Cir. 1889).
"The Courts while justifying separate accommodations, require equal accommoda-
tions. This is as impossible as to have all points of the earth simultaneously equi-
distant from the sun." Id.
23
Bogen: Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
the same judge four years earlier, this admiralty libel had nothing to do
with any statute.
4. Houck v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co. (1888)
The last federal court case in the string citation was a successful suit
brought by Mrs. Lola Houck. 1 In the case, Mrs. Houck suffered a mis-
carriage after riding on the outside platform of a train when she traveled
from Victoria to Galveston, Texas to be with her ill child who was staying
with his grandmother. 112 Thejury awarded Mrs. Houck $5000 in damages
for the behavior of the conductor in refusing to allow her to ride in the
rear car, and attempting to force her into the 'Jim Crow" car.11 3 The
Circuit Court agreed that the 'Jim Crow car" was not as comfortable or
inviting as the other car. 114 The circuit courtjudge refused to order a new
trial, although he did require a reduction in the amount of damages. 1
15
The appellate decision focused on issues of fact, but it also referred to the
trial court's charge that a railway company:
(M]ay or might be, under a proper showing of facts,justified and
authorized in law, in the management of its complicated inter-
ests, in setting apart one or more coaches for the use exclusively
of white people, and to set apart other cars for the use exclusively
of colored people; but when the management undertakes to
carry out such a rule it is charged with the duty of giving or fur-
nishing to the colored passenger who pays first-class fare over the
line a car to ride in as safe, and substantially as inviting, to travel
in, as it (the management) furnishes to white passengers.1 16
These four federal court cases cited in Justice Brown's opinion
demonstrated that federal courts applied the common law of carriers to
require private companies to furnish equal accommodations if they sepa-
rated their passengers. None, however, addressed whether the state could
require such a separation, since that was never at issue in any of the cases.
Thus, Justice Brown had no basis for his statement in Plessy that these cases
held constitutional a state segregation statute.
D. The Constitutional Power of a State to Prohibit Discrimination: People v.
King (1888)
Between the citations to McGuinn and Houck, Justice Brown cited Peo-
ple v. King,117 an 1888 suit in New York concerning a skating rink. Rather
111. See Houck v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 F. 226 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1888).
112. Id. at 227 (discussing treatment of Mrs. Houck while onboard train).
113. See id. at 229 (outlining jury's decision).
114. See id. at 229.
115. See id. at 229-30 (discussing judge's decision not to order new trial).
116. Id. at 228.
117. 110 N.Y. 418 (1888).
[Vol. 52: p. 411434
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than compelling separation, the New York Penal Code Section 383 for-
bade racial discrimination in a variety of public accommodations.' 18 Un-
like all the other cases cited, this decision did not involve transportation,
although the statutory language included common carriers. The decision
indicated that states could regulate the way that common carriers treated
their passengers, but it did not imply that the regulation could require the
common carrier to separate its passengers.
Defendants were indicted for refusing to sell skating exhibition tickets
to three colored men. The defense was based on the contention that the
law was an unconstitutional deprivation of their property rights. The de-
fendants admitted that carriers and inns could be regulated,1 19 but con-
tended that a skating rink could not.
120
The New York court upheld the statute as a proper use of the police
power.' 2 1 Its rationale was based on the public purpose of preventing dis-
crimination. Indeed the Court said, "The state could not pass a law mak-
118. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 383 (McKinney 2007). Section 383 of the Penal
Code declares that:
[N]o citizen of this state can, by reason of race, color or previous condi-
tion of servitude, be excluded from the equal enjoyment of any accom-
modation, facility or privilege furnished by inn-keepers or common
carriers, or by owners, managers, or lessees of theaters or other places of
amusement, by teachers and officers of common schools and public insti-
tutions of learning, or by cemetery associations.
Id.
119. See Bogen, Innkeeper's Tale, supra note 38, at 52. Over the centuries, since
the beginning of the common carrier doctrine in England, the focus had shifted
from protection of clients to the public nature of the occupation. This helped
lead to the historically incorrect assumption that the obligations of the common
carrier existed because of its unique status as a "public" occupation. Id. The "pub-
lic" business was a step beyond merely "affected with a public interest" so defend-
ants in King assumed that regulation of carriers was appropriate for government.
Id.
120. See King, 110 N.Y. at 419. In King, the court stated:
May not the state impose upon individuals having places of public resort
the same restriction which the Federal Constitution places upon the state.
It is not claimed that that part of the statute giving to colored people
equal rights, at the hands of innkeepers and common carriers, is an in-
fraction of the Constitution. But the business of an innkeeper or a com-
mon carrier, when conducted by an individual, is a private business,
receiving no special privilege or protection from the state. By the com-
mon law, innkeepers and common carriers are bound to furnish equal
facilities to all, without discrimination, because public policy requires
them so to do. The business of conducting a theater or place of public
amusement is also a private business in which any one may engage, in the
absence of any statute or ordinance. But it has been the practice, which
has passed unchallenged, for the legislature to confer upon municipali-
ties the power to regulate by ordinance the licensing of theaters and
shows, and to enforce restrictions relating to such places, in the public
interest, and no one claims that such statutes are an invasion of the right
of liberty or property guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 427.
121. See id. at 418. In its holding the New York court provided the following
rationale:
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ing the discrimination made by the defendant." 122 That certainly does not
hold it is constitutional for a state to require parties to segregate.
E. Federal Non-Discrimination Statute Interpreted to Permit Separate If Equal
The last cases injustice Brown's string were decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. William H. Heard, a former slave who became a
bishop in the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church, was the com-
plainant in both, and the Georgia Railroad Company was the defen-
dant. 123 The issue in each commission was whether the railroad company
violated federal law prohibiting discrimination.
1. Heard v. Georgia R.R. Co. (1888)
In 1887, Reverend Heard, minister of Mt. Zion AME church in
Charleston, South Carolina bought a ticket in Ohio to travel back to South
Carolina. He had to change trains in Atlanta for the trip to Augusta, and
the Georgia Railroad Company separated the passengers. Reverend
Heard brought a complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission
because the Georgia Railroad Company prevented him from going into
the rear car, which it reserved solely for white passengers, and forced him
to ride in the 'Jim Crow" car, where a partition separated smokers of all
races and genders from an area reserved for only colored people. The Jim
Crow car had no carpet, no upholstery on the seats, and no ice water. The
Commission concluded that Reverend Heard was discriminated against
solely because of his color. They found his accommodations were inferior
in violation of Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which prohibited
discrimination. 124
We have referred to these amendments and to the cases construing them,
because they disclose the fact that, in the judgment of the nation, the
public welfare required that no state should be permitted to establish by
law such a discrimination against persons of color as was made by the
defendant in this case, for we think it incontestable, that a State law ex-
cluding colored people from admission to places of public amusement
would be considered as a violation of the Federal Constitution. It would
seem, indeed, in view of the act of March 1, 1875, that, in the opinion of
congress, the amendments had a much broader scope, and prevented not
only discriminating legislation of this character by the state, but also such
discrimination by individuals, since the jurisdiction of congress to pass a
law forbidding the exclusion of persons of color from places of public
amusement, and annexing a penalty for its violation, must be derived, if it
exists, from the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. It can-
not be doubted that before they were adopted the power to enact such a
regulation resided exclusively in the states.
Id. at 425-26.
122. Id. at 427.
123. WILLIAM H. HEARD, FROM SLAVERY TO BISHOPRIC IN THE A.M.E. CHURCH:
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 13 (1924). Interestingly, Bishop Heard's autobiography makes
no mention of the litigation before the ICC.
124. See Heard v. Georgia R.R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 719 (1888).
[Vol. 52: p. 411
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Commissioner Schoonmaker's opinion in Heard referred to the com-
mission's earlier decision in Councill v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Com-
pany, 125 and said that the "decision was based upon the principles of
justice and equality in the transportation of persons and property embod-
ied in the Act, and resting upon no less a foundation than the Constitu-
tion of the United States."' 26 The Commission insisted that separation
required equality, but separation itself was permissible.
Heard's lawyers had "urged identity of white and colored passengers
paying the same fare as the only absolute equality under the law"' 27 but
Commissioner Schoonmaker distinguished other statutes and held that:
Identity, then, in the sense that all must be admitted to the same
car and that under no circumstances separation can be made, is
not indispensable to give effect to the statute. Its fair meaning is
complied with when transportation and accommodations equal
in all respects and at like cost are furnished and the same protec-
tion enforced.' 2
8
Nevertheless, on February 15, 1888, the Commission issued a cease
and desist order against the Georgia railroad. 129
2. Heard v. Georgia R.R. Co. (1889)
In August of 1888, Reverend Heard was appointed minister to Allen
Chapel in Philadelphia. While there performing his duties, he studied at
the Reformed Episcopal Seminary. 13 0 On January 25, 1889, he purchased
a railroad ticket to Atlanta by way of Augusta. Despite the order of the
Commission in the first case, Reverend Heard was again directed to a par-
titioned car, but one with cocoa matting on the floor and plush seats. The
white car had an improved heating system and the smoking section of the
Jim Crow car switched sides whenever the train made its return trip so the
tobacco smoke sank into the car. Reverend Heard filed another com-
plaint. Once more, the Commission found that he was required to travel
in a car inferior in accommodations, and it issued a cease and desist order
to the railroad company.13 1 Commissioner Bragg's opinion in the second
case also held that the railway company should provide equal protection
125. 1 I.C.C. 339, 340 (1887); see also Heard, 1 I.C.C. at 720.
126. Heard, 1 I.C.C. at 721.
127. Id. at 722.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See HEARD, supra note 123, at 75-76.
131. See Heard v. Ga. Ry. Co., 2 I.C.C. 508 (1889). The Supreme Court in
Plessy cites the second case first, and uses S.C. to indicate "same case" when it cites
the earlier decision. But the decisions were on two separate complaints although
the issues were essentially the same and the parties were identical.
2007] 437
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to passengers in both cars to keep them from disorderly conduct of other
passengers.132
The cease and desist orders may have given Bishop Heard some com-
fort, but the failure to follow the first order suggests that the comfort was
minimal. In any event, the cases and the orders required equal accommo-
dations where the carriers decided to separate the races, but gave no dis-
cussion of the constitutionality of any statutes that required segregation.
Thus, the Supreme Court erred in citing these two decisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission as finding a statute that required segregation
was constitutional. They did not. Rather, they interpreted a federal stat-
ute that prohibited discrimination to require no more than the common
law obligations of common carriers. They found that private carriers did
not violate the federal statute when they provided separate but equal ac-
commodations. The difference between permissible and required is huge,
but the Supreme Court ignored it when they cited the two decisions in
Heard.
In sum, of the twelve cases cited by the Supreme Court in Plessy, only
one case, the suit by Ida Wells, involved a statute that even arguably re-
quired segregation. Although Wells's suit involved a statute that may have
required a separate car, the statute was crucial to her claim and neither
side challenged it. Thus, the Court did not hold anything about its consti-
tutionality. Eight cases discussed the common law requirement of equality
when common carriers decided on their own to segregate, and the re-
maining three involved statutes that prohibited discrimination. Courts and
agencies used the common law requirement of "equality" to interpret anti-
discrimination statutes to permit segregation, but the source of the dis-
crimination in every case was the decision of the private carrier or amuse-
ment park, not the compulsion of a statute.
IV. JUSTICE BROWN'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASES
This article so far has demonstrated that the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Plessy made a false statement of fact; the citations did not support
Justice Brown's statement. It is more difficult to determine whether Jus-
tice Brown knew that the cases he cited did not hold any segregation stat-
ute constitutional. Even a cursory reading of the cases reveals that they
are not statutory holdings, but he could have cited them without having
read them.
Courts sometimes get incorrect ideas from the assertions and citations
of the litigants; however, only a few of the cases that the Plessy Court used
in the string cite were mentioned in the briefs or opinions below or
presented to the Court in the attorneys' briefs. Even the secondary
sources cited by the parties did not arrange the cases in this fashion.
Thus, the responsibility for the misstatement lies with Justice Brown, who
132. See id. at 511.
Vol. 52: p. 411
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almost certainly knew that at least some of the cases did not stand for the
proposition he asserted.
A. Cases Not Cited in the Record Before the Court
There is no mention of Day, Williams, Benson, McGuinn, King, Houck,
or either of the Heard cases in the opinions below or in any of the briefs.
Consequently, Justice Brown must have turned to other sources to find
cases to buttress his conclusion. He probably found them in Section 542
of Hutchinson's Law of Carriers (hereinafter "Hutchinson on Carriers").13 3
All but one of the cases in the string citation appear there and no other
secondary work cited in the record included so many of the cases. Justice
Fenner cited Hutchinson on Carriers in his opinion for the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Plessy, and that opinion constituted much of defendant
Ferguson's brief before the Supreme Court. 134 ThusJustice Brown likely
saw the citation to Hutchinson on Carriers as a basic source for carrier law.
The briefs and opinions below did not distinguish between citing
school cases and citing carrier cases. Justice Brown did. The grouping of
state common law, Tennessee cases, federal court decisions and finally In-
terstate Commerce Commission cases generally follows their presentation
in Hutchinson on Carriers. But the treatise made it clear that the cases were
about the carrier's power to segregate and not the state's authority to re-
quire segregation. The text focused on the carrier's right to have separate
classes with separate fares, but it suggested the separation might also be
based on type of accommodations or persons to be carried. 13 5 It said
nothing about any law requiring segregation, but only discussed the power
of the carrier to make its own decision to segregate:
Provision is accordingly made for such a separation, almost uni-
versally, by steamboats and railway carriers, and the necessary
regulations to enforce it are adopted, and such regulations have
been held to be not only lawful but highly commendable, as be-
133. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 619.
134. The briefs for Ferguson and the state incorporated most of the prior
material on his behalf. 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 81-134 (Kurland & Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS] (noting Fenner's opinion at 123-33). The brief of M.J. Cun-
ningham, the Attorney General of Louisiana, was largely written by Lionel Adams,
of counsel, along with Alexander Porter Morse. It recited the facts including Fer-
guson's opinion, Plessy's petition, the answer, etc. The brief basically quoted the
substantive argument from Adams' brief to the Supreme Court of Louisiana with
citations to the Encyclopedia of Law, Logwood and The Sue as well as the Louisville
case. The brief stated that the Attorney General could not devote the time to the
brief he intended, so he copied the opinion of Justice Fenner for the Louisiana
Supreme Court in the brief. "It thoroughly covers the grounds presented in the
case and we therefore embody it in full." Id. at 122.
135. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 619.
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ing conducive both to the public convenience and to the interest
of the carrier. 13
6
The footnote to this discussion of the common law obligation of carri-
ers contained all the carrier cases mentioned in the briefs and most of the
string citation cases that were not mentioned in the briefs.1 37 Thus, if
Justice Brown took the cases from this source, he should have known that
they dealt with the approval of regulations made by railways and steamboat
companies and not with state statutes.
1. Day v. Owen
Henry Billings Brown was a Michigan lawyer. His autobiography
states that he spent his time in 1860 familiarizing himself with all the Mich-
igan cases in the first twelve volumes of the Michigan Reports, therefore,
he must have known Day,138 even if he was unaware of its later overruling.
He knew also from the citation that it arose prior to the Civil War, and
therefore could not involve the Fourteenth Amendment. As an admiralty
lawyer in Michigan, he should have been particularly sensitive to that
case. 139
Day was cited in the first paragraph of the footnote in Hutchinson on
Carriers as an exemplar of the steamboat's power to separate passengers.
In the second paragraph of the footnote, the author said that the case
held "a carrier by steamboat might lawfully make and enforce a regulation
excluding such passengers from the cabin appropriated to white passen-
gers." 140 Thus both text and footnote demonstrated without doubt that
Day did not involve a statute, but a regulation made by the carrier itself.
Further, Brown discussed Hall v. De Cuit.4 1 in his Plessy opinion. Jus-
tice Clifford's concurring opinion in Hall discussed Day and said it deter-
mined that the place where passengers may go on a ship "is, where such
136. Id.
137. See id. at 619 n.1.
138. MEMOIR OF HENRY BILLINGS BROWN (Charles Kent ed., Duffield & Co.
1915), available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04-library/subs_
volumes/04_c04_a.html [hereinafter BROWN MEMOIRS].
In the autumn [of 1860] I took a modest office which I shared with Bela
Hubbard, a valued friend and eminent citizen, and devoted myself less to
the practice of law, which was meagre enough, than to familiarising my-
self with the Michigan Reports, of which there were then only a dozen
volumes.
Id.
139. There is no indication in the decision that it is admiralty and Day was
decided long before the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205 (1917), superseded by statute as stated in Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester,
632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980), held that admiralty law is federal, and states must
apply federal admiralty law. Id. at 218. Brown, however, as an admiralty lawyer,
should at least have been sensitive to the facts of a case in his home state that dealt
with the operation of a vessel on navigable waters.
140. HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 619 n.1.
141. 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
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rules and regulations exist, to be determined by the proprietors."' 42
Thus, Justice Brown may have cited Day because it was so familiar to him,
but even if he found it elsewhere, he would have known that it did not
involve a statute.
2. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams
The second paragraph of the footnote in Hutchinson on Carriers dis-
cussed Day and West Chester and added Williams. The discussion described
West Chester as involving a "regulation of a similar character." 14 3 After
quoting Agnew's statement that separation was sanctioned by law and cus-
tom from the foundation of the government, the footnote said: "It was also
conceded by the court in the case of The Chicago, etc. R.R. v. Williams, 55
Ill. 185."144 Its antecedent appears to be the principle that a carrier's reg-
ulation separating the races was permissible. Nothing in the discussion
suggested that Williams involved any statute. Further, in contrast to the
paragraph in which Day, West Chester and Williams appeared, the next para-
graph involved a discussion of statute.
3. Memphis & Charleston R.R. v. Benson
The third paragraph of the footnote to the ability of carriers to segre-
gate their passengers began with the Tennessee decisions:
The Code of Tennessee, § 2366, permits the separation of whites
from blacks where equal accommodations are afforded. See
Chesapeake, etc. R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613; Memphis, etc. R.
Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627. This is required in Mississippi. See
Louisville etc. R'y Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662.145
Note that the discussion of the Tennessee statute stated that it was
permissive rather than mandatory and distinguished it from the require-
ment of the Mississippi statute in Louisville. Although Justice Brown could
have taken from the citation the incorrect impression that Benson involved
the Tennessee statute, it was clear that the author of the treatise did not
believe that the statute required segregation. So if Hutchinson on Carriers
was Brown's source for the Benson and Wells decisions, he would have
known that those cases did not uphold a statute requiring segregation.1 4 6
Brown should have had a particular awareness of the Tennessee cases
because they were decided in the Sixth Circuit, though in state rather than
federal court. But his awareness may have led him to misunderstand their
142. Id. at 501.
143. HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 619 n.1.
144. Id. at 620 n.1.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., id. at 621 n.1. Further, HUTCHINSON ON CARRIERS cited Benson
for the proposition that a regulation that created a "ladies car" would be reasona-
ble and valid. Id. Thus, Brown should have known that Benson was a gender rather
than a race case and could not have been a holding on a racial segregation statute.
2007]
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significance. Perhaps Justice Brown first heard about the cases in casual
conversation. Justice Howell E. Jackson was one ofJustice Brown's closest
friends on the Supreme Court from the days of their working together on
the Sixth Circuit.14 7 JusticeJackson came from Tennessee and was circuit
judge for the Sixth Circuit when Benson and Wells were decided. Although
Jackson died the year before Plessy came before the Court, he may have
mentioned the state law and these decisions in general terms. Thus, it is
not as clear as Day thatJustice Brown knew that these cases did not uphold
a statute requiring segregation.
4. McGuinn v. Forbes; Houck v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co.
Immediately after citing the Tennessee cases and the Mississippi law,
the footnote in Hutchinson on Carriers cited all of the federal court cases
used in Plessy's string cite:
Such separation is held lawful either as to cars, state-rooms,
berths or tables where the carrier, in good faith, endeavors to
give equal accommodations to each. Houck v. Railway Co. 38
Fed. Rep. 226; McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed. Rep. 639; The Sue, 22
Fed. Rep. 843; Murphy v. Railroad Co. 23 Fed. Rep. 637; Log-
wood v. Railroad Co. 23 Fed. Rep. 318.148
One might in confusion think "such separation" refers to the re-
quired separation of the Mississippi statute rather than the general pro-
position of permitting separation when it was equal; however, this is a very
unlikely reading. Where statutes existed, the footnote specified them-
Tennessee, Mississippi. The entire footnote was to a text on the carrier's
right to separate the races, and the rest of the paragraph in the footnote
did not discuss statutes requiring separation but rather Coger v. The Packet
Co.,1 49 a decision that prohibited a steamboat company from enforcing
regulations discriminating against the races. 150 The use of Coger con-
trasted the carrier's right to separate the races with a statute that prohib-
ited it.
5. The Heard Decisions
The next sentence in the text in Hutchinson on Carriers referred to
gender separation on common carriers. The footnote to this sentence
147. Irving Schiffman, Howell E. Jackson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 800 (Leon Friedman & Fred Israel eds., Chelsea House
Publishers 1997). Jackson was elected to the state legislature in 1880, but after
taking his seat he soon was elected to the United States Senate, and took office
there before the Tennessee segregation law passed. Id. at 797. He served with
Brown on the Sixth Circuit in 1886, just a year after Judge Hammond's charge in
Logwood. He lived in Nashville when the opinions in Wells and Benson came down.
148. HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 620 n.1.
149. 37 Iowa 145 (1873).
150. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 620 n.1 (discussing Coger).
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cited the Heard decisions by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It
quoted heavily from the second decision, but had a "[s]ee further" refer-
ence to the earlier decision "where it is held that colored people may be
assigned to separate cars if they are given equal accommodations and
protection."
1 51
Justice Brown must have known that segregation was not required by
any statute of the United States, but the races were separated because the
carrier decided to do so. The citation form and the discussions of Heard in
Hutchinson on Carriers demonstrate that the question was under the Inter-
state Commerce Act. There is no excuse for Justice Brown to cite Heard as
upholding a statute requiring segregation. He had to know that it did not.
6. People v. King
People v. King is the only case in the string citation that does not ap-
pear in Hutchinson on Carriers. Justice Brown may have gotten his refer-
ence to King from the The American and English Encyclopedia of Law152
(hereinafter A&E Encyclopedia). Defendant's attorney Lionel Adams re-
lied upon the Encyclopedia and Justice Fenner quoted from it as well.
The A&E Encyclopedia provided that the regulation of individuals' civil
rights is a proper subject for the exercise of the police power. It gave as
examples various laws securing equal public accommodations, and it cited
King in support.15 3 The citation to King appears in the carryover footnote
on the same page as a footnote citing some of the common carrier cases.
The A&E Encyclopedia makes clear on the prior page that the police
power is usually used to end discrimination, and that King is the promi-
nent example for that proposition. Justice Brown should have known,
therefore, that King did not uphold a law requiring segregation.
Another possible source for the citation was Justice Brown's new col-
league, Rufus Peckham. When Peckham was on the New York Court of
Appeals, he dissented in the King decision. Peckham certainly knew what
that case was about, and yet he joined in the opinion without making any
apparent objection to Justice Brown's use of it in the string citation.
B. Cases Cited in the Record
Justice Brown may have been misled with respect to four of the cases
by the citations of the attorneys and the court below. Lionel Adams brief
for Ferguson to the Supreme Court of Louisiana said: "Laws may be en-
acted providing for separate schools for the different races and separate
accommodations by common carriers. 18 A. and E. Ency. Law pp. 753,
151. Id. at 621-22 n.1.
152. See 18 THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw 753-54 (John
Houston Merrill ed., Edward Thompson Co. 1892) [hereinafter A&E ENCYC. L.].
153. See id.
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754 and authorities cited. 1 5 4 This sentence was repeated in the brief to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 155
The A&E Encyclopedia, cited by Adams, used four of the cases in the
string citation for the proposition that laws providing for separate accom-
modations by private carriers were within the state police power. The En-
cyclopedia provided that "the regulation of the civil rights of individuals is
unquestionably a proper subject for the exercise of a State's police power,"
giving as examples various "statutes" securing equal public accommoda-
tions.156 It added "also laws providing for separate schools for the differ-
ent races, and separate accommodations by common carriers." 15 7 The
authority for this statement was in the footnote. The footnote first cited
the Supreme Court's Louisville case, then several cases upholding school
segregation statutes and finally added:
The same principle has been upheld in the case of common car-
riers in West Chester etc. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209; The Sue,
22 Fed. Rep. 843; Logwood v. Memphis etc. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep.
318; Murphy v. Western etc. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 637; Chesa-
peake etc. R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613." 158
Four of these cases (West Chester, The Sue, Logwood and Wells) are in the
string citation. The Encyclopedia seems to assert that they support the
proposition that laws for separate accommodations by common carriers
are within the police power of the state, but there is an ambiguity. The
footnote's four preceding paragraphs named specific statutes, acts or pro-
visions of the Constitution, but the paragraph on common carriers did
not. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the "principle" that the cases
upheld was one of state power to require segregation by statute or only the
principle of segregation. It seems most likely that the author believed that
the same principle applied to common carrier rules and state laws-that
they could require racial separation if substantially equal facilities were
provided.
Judge Fenner's opinion for the Louisiana State Supreme Court in
Plessy adopted that view. His citation of Miles, Wells, Logwood and Murphy
mingled statutes and regulations by the common carrier in a string cita-
tion that hid which case applied to what proposition. Thus, the Louisiana
Court did not claim that any of those cases dealt with a statute. Instead,
Judge Fenner treated the validity of the regulation made by a common
carrier as equivalent to the validity of a statute requiring segregation. In
154. Brief of Lionel Adams for Respondent, at 27, Ex Parte Homer A. Plessy,
No. 11134 (La. Dec. 1892).
155. Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error to the Supreme Court of the
United States, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 84, 117.
156. A&E ENCYC. L., supra note 152, at 753-54.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 754-55.
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both cases he believed the applicable principle called for equality of rights
and not identity of rights:
But the validity of such statutes and of similar regulations made by
common carriers in absence of statute, and the validity of similar regu-
lations or statutes as applied to public schools, has arisen in very
many cases before the highest courts of the several states, and
before inferior federal courts, resulting in an almost uniform
course of decision to the effect that statutes or regulations enforc-
ing the separation of the races in public conveyances or in public
schools, so long, at least, as the facilities or accommodations pro-
vided are substantially equal, do not abridge any privilege or im-
munity of citizens, or otherwise contravene the fourteenth
amendment.
We refer to the following among other numerous, decisions: Rail-
road Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. Stat., 209; .... Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry.
Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662;... Railroad Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613;
.. The Sue, 22 Fed. Rep. 843; Logwood vs. Railroad Co., 23 Fed.
Rep. 318; ....
.... They all accord in the general principle that, in such matters,
equality, and not identity or community, of accommodations, is
the extreme test of conformity to the requirements of the four-
teenth amendment.159
The brief of Alexander Porter Morse to the Supreme Court of the
United States on behalf of Judge Ferguson also mentioned the same four
cases. Morse did not say that the cases upheld such statutes. Instead, he
wrote that they provided reasoning that led to the conclusion that the
power to segregate was committed to the authority of local state
governments. 160
The briefs and the opinion blur the difference between segregation
by the private carrier allowed by common law and racial separation re-
quired by statute. The briefs and opinions below may have supported Jus-
tice Brown's belief that the cases held that segregation statutes did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment,1 6 1 but they mentioned only four of
the twelve cases that he cited, and were vague on the exact holding of
those cases. The question is whether Judge Brown knew or should have
known that these cases dealt with regulations by carriers and not with state
statutes. In this connection, we should look at the cases one by one.
159. Ex parte Homer A. Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (La. 1893) (emphasis added).
160. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 248.
161. See Barton J. Bernstein, Case Law in Plessy v. Ferguson, 47 J. NEGRO HIST.
192, 195 n.15 (1962) ("The Supreme Court was probably misled by the Louisiana
high court and cited some of the cases.").
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1. West Chester and Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles
Henry Billings Brown was an attorney and director of a street railway
company in 1875, a time when West Chester was the primary precedent for
separate but equal as a common law rule. Further, in his opinion in Plessy,
Justice Brown discussed Hall.16 2 Justice Clifford's concurring opinion in
Hall itself discussed West Chester, saying:
[T]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided directly that a
public carrier may separate passengers in his conveyance; and
they deduce his power to do so from his right of private property
in the means of conveyance, and the necessity which arises for
such a regulation to promote the public interest.1 6 3
Recognition of a carrier's property right to determine whether to segre-
gate its passengers is a far cry from recognizing state restrictions on its
property right that would compel it to segregate.
When the Louisiana Supreme Court in Ex parte Plessy quoted West
Chester, it acknowledged that the case preceded the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.164 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that the Four-
teenth Amendment made no difference, Justice Brown knew that West
Chester could not have held any law constitutional with respect to an
Amendment that had not yet been adopted.
Finally, it seems likely that Justice Brown found most of the cases he
cites in the string citation in Hutchinson on Carriers.165 That book, how-
ever, discusses West Chester in a footnote, in which there is a discussion of
the right of the common carrier to separate passengers, but which does
not have anything to do with a statutory requirement. In view of his back-
ground in transport law, the ambiguity of the discussion of West Chester in
the record, the acknowledgement by the Louisiana court of its timing, and
the discussion of West Chester in Hutchinson on Carriers, Justice Brown
should have known that West Chester did not support his claim that it up-
held the statute.
2. The Sue and Logwood v. Memphis R.R. Co.
Judge Brown was an admiralty practitioner, author of Brown's Admi-
ralty Reports (1876) as well as Cases on Admiralty (1896), which he used for
his lectures on admiralty at Georgetown. 16 6 He could see from the name
of the case that The Sue was a libel in admiralty, and he should have known
that no statute was involved. Similarly, Logwood was a Sixth Circuit opinion
while Brown was a federal district judge in that circuit. If he discussed the
162. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 546 (1896) (discussing Hall v. De
Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877)).
163. Hall, 95 U.S. at 503 (Clifford, J., concurring).
164. See Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950-51 (1892).
165. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 80, at 619.
166. See 4 BROWN MEMOIRS, supra note 138.
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case law and decisions of his fellow judges, he should have recognized the
case. 
16 7
Justice Brown may not have seen the brief that Plessy's lawyers filed in
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which specifically stated that Logwood and
The Sue did not involve statutes. 168 But Judge Ferguson's opinion, the
matter appealed from, quoted extensively from Logwood, including the
portion of the charge involving the conductor's claim that he was going to
admit her into the ladies car.1 69 Further, Judge Ferguson specifically re-
ferred to the carrier's right to segregate where accommodations were
equal in the Maryland admiralty case. 170 In light of Judge Ferguson's use
of the cases to demonstrate the reasonableness of the carrier's decision
rather than the validity of a statute, and Justice Brown's facility with admi-
ralty law and his work on the Sixth Circuit, he should have recognized that
these two cases involved a regulation by a carrier and not by the state.
3. Chesapeake R.R. Co. v. Wells
Unlike Logwood, West Chester and The Sue, the record did not reveal
much discussion of Wells. The opinion in Wells was brief, and lawyers and
courts used it primarily as part of a string citation rather than discussing it.
It was singled out, however in Hutchinson on Carriers, which stated that the
statute in Tennessee permitted carriers to segregate and contrasted it to
the Mississippi statute that required segregation.
In short, Justice Brown should have recognized from the ambiguity of
the references and from his prior experiences that these cases did not
167. The discussion of both The Sue and Logwood in the briefs and opinions
below suggested that they were common carrier cases. See, e.g., LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 134, at 27. For example, after saying "even in the absence of any legisla-
tion on the subject the common carrier was at liberty to adopt in reference thereto
such reasonable regulations as the common law allows," attorney Adams cited The
Sue in his brief to Louisiana Supreme Court for the proposition that passengers
may be separated by race. Brief of Lionel Adams for Respondent, at 27, Ex Parte
Homer A. Plessy, No. 11134 (Dec. 1892); see also id. (citing Logwood for proposition
that equality did not mean identity). The briefs for Ferguson and the State before
the United States Supreme Court incorporated most of the prior material on his
behalf, but not these statements.
168. See Brief of Relator for Writs of Prohibition and Certiorari to the Judge
of Section A Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans at 22, Ex Parte
Plessy, No. 11134 (La. Nov. 30, 1892). The Brief explained:
The three cases referred to by the Honorable Court a qua, in the opinion
were suits by passengers against common carriers for discrimination as to
accommodations; they did not involve the validity of a State law, nor any
Federal question. Logwood and Ux. vs. M. & C.R.R., 23 Fed. Rep., p. 318;
The Sue., 22 Fed. Rep., p. 843; Murphy vs. W. & A. R.R., 23 Fed. Rep., p.
637. They were all decided against the carriers, who were mulcted in
damages.
Id.
169. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 91-108 (noting Ferguson's opin-
ion); see also id. at 96-97 (discussing Logwood).
170. See id. at 98.
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uphold statutes that required segregation. He may not have read all the
cases he cited, but he knew the name of the cases individually since he
reconfigured the citations and therefore must have seen that at least some
of them did not involve the issue of the constitutionality of a statute.
17 1
He appeared to take the cases from Hutchinson on Carriers, where the text
distinguished the Tennessee statute from one that required segregation
and made clear that the other cases were common law obligations of carri-
ers. Thus, it is likely thatJustice Brown knew that at least some of the cases
cited did not involve statutes. In short, he lied when he said that they held
such statutes were constitutional.
V. WHY JUSTICE BROWN MISSTATED THE CASES
The decision in Plessy was the product of a host of social, political,
economic and sociological forces. But the determination to uphold segre-
gation does not explain the misstatement of the cases in the string cita-
tion, because Justice Brown and the Court could have used the cases
accurately to reach the same result. The cases held that segregation on
common carriers was a reasonable policy when the races were afforded
equivalent accommodations, and that regulation of carrier policy was
within state police powers. Finally, they demonstrated that courts under-
stood that a requirement of "equality" required substantial equivalence
and not identity, and that laws that prohibit "discrimination" do not pre-
clude separation of the races. The cases did not hold that the standard for
equal protection under the United States Constitution is the same as the
common law and statutory standard for equal treatment by common carri-
ers. But that argument was easily made. The question was an open one.
The Court could have simply asserted that the same standard applies, and
pointed in its own prior decisions in Hall and Louisville as suggesting that
segregation laws were permissible.
Justice Brown used the string citation to create the appearance that
the decision in Plessy was not significant, that he was not doing anything
new, and that it was not necessary to discuss why he concluded the Four-
teenth Amendment only required equivalent and not identical treatment.
He knew that his use of the cases would not be challenged because they
were not critical to his decision. He also recognized that the conflation of
common carrier law with the constitutional principle would be accepted
because: 1) prior Supreme Court decisions had switched the key language
171. See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE ISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAw CLERK 51 (Stanford Univ. Press 2006) (not-
ing that Brown employed Albert B. Hall as his clerk from January 1891 to 1896 and
then Frederick E. Chaplin); see also id. at 54 (appointing clerks as "stenographic
clerks" and presumably did typing and shorthand); id. at 54 (suggesting that clerks
may have examined cases cited in briefs, as Edwin Rombauer did for Justice
Harlan). But see id. (concluding that justices like Brown in this period used their
assistants primarily as stenographers). See generally BROWN MEMOIRS, supra note 138
(omitting mention of his clerks in his memoirs).
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of the Amendment from privileges and immunities to equality; 2) the
equality component of carrier law was developed in light of the Four-
teenth Amendment; and 3) the test of reasonableness under due process
was the same term used as the starting point for carrier law and its equality
component was readily conflated with equal protection. Further, common
carriers had a unique public status under the common law and the com-
mon law restrictions on carriers tended to protect the rights of African-
Americans more rigorously than did statutes. Additionally, interpreting
equality to require identical rights would undermine anti-miscegenation
laws that had already been accepted by the courts.
Undoubtedly, Justice Brown honestly believed that equality meant the
same thing in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution as it did in
the common law obligation of carriers; however, he should have known
that the cited cases did not involve statutes. Justice Brown may have be-
lieved that the distinction between statute and carrier regulation had no
real significance to the result in this case and that an elaborate discussion
of the reasoning would only detract from the opinion. Certainly it would
not have changed the result. But that should not prevent an examination
today of the difference between constitutional principle and the rules ap-
plicable to restrain private actors.
A. The Function of String Citations
String citations have fallen somewhat out of favor today, in theory, if
not in practice. They are often disparaged as an unnecessary display of
learning that eats up trees with no benefit to society.1 7 2 They served a
purpose during the nineteenth century when lawyers and judges had diffi-
culty getting access to the cases. Treatises and digests did not give much
indication of relative precedential value to help the attorney select the
most important sources and lawyers then often listed the cases in their
briefs straight from the treatise. This often became a standard element of
172. See Thomas M. Lockney, Tribute: Justice Beryl Levine: Taking Her Title Seri-
ously in North Dakota Criminal Cases, 72 N.D. L. REv. 967, 976 n.61 (1996) ("[I]n the
interest of saving trees, the STRING CITATION is omitted."); see also RUGGIERO ALDIS-
ERT, OPINION WRITING 227 (1990) ("You should avoid string citations."); WILLIAM
REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-03 (3d ed. 2002). Reynolds writes:
One vice in the use of authority that besets both bench and bar is the
citation to a 'string' of authority, none of which is discussed by the au-
thor. Such usage fosters a belief that the author has not analyzed the
authority referred to, but, instead, has merely taken a group of citations
from a convenient reference.
Id.; Howard C. Westwood, Brief Writing, 21 A.B.A. L.J. 121, 121-22 (1935) ("The use
of authority presents a vexing problem. The chief difficulty is that it has not yet
been sufficiently impressed upon the bar that law is not found but is made by the
judges.... [T]he string citation should be sparingly used."); Irving Younger, Cit-
ing Cases forMaximum Impact, A.B.A.J. Oct. 1, 1986, at 110 (writing "hideous on the
page and useless to the judge reading it").
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the decisions as well.' 7 3 We no longer need such a finding aid. Neverthe-
less, the string citation still serves a variety of purposes. 174
In addition to displaying the writer's research, the string citation ap-
propriately marshals cases to demonstrate that multiple courts have de-
cided a point in the same way or that a point has been well settled for a
long time in a particular jurisdiction. This can be used to offset claims
that the law is different (the battle of string citations).1 75 It may also be
used to strengthen arguments that change should not be made. The
depth and firmness of current law affects the degree to which people will
have relied upon the current principle and the degree to which alteration
will upset expectations and respect for the stability of the law. 1 7 6
One scholar notes, "String citations reflect the justices' belief that set-
tled law decides the problem, despite the dissent's contrary authority."' 7 7
It is a mark of the formal style,' 78 and was particularly useful when judges
and jurisprudes argued that the judge found the law and did not make it.
They show that the judge is following the common wisdom and not acting
out of his or her own subjective views. In that way, the string cite avoids
the onus of responsibility for the decision, indicates that the decision is
not particularly significant, avoids the need to state other reasons and dis-
courages counterarguments.1 79
1. Display of Learning
Briefs, opinions and even law review articles may resort to string cita-
tion to demonstrate their scholarship, but that is not a sufficient reason
for their use.18 0 Where the type of writing attempts to be comprehensive,
173. See Patti Ogden, Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law: A Story of Legal
Citation Indexes, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 16-17 (1993).
174. See _K. DuVivier, String Citations-Part I, 29 COLO. LAW. No. 7, 83-84
(July 2000) ("String citations are appropriate when you are trying to give readers
comprehensive coverage of an issue. They also are helpful to show that a particu-
lar rule is widely accepted."); see also IRK. DuVivier, String Citations-Part I, 29
COLO. LAw. No. 9, 67 (Sept. 2000).
175. See Theodore Blumoff, The Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law and History,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 561 (1990); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The battle of the string citations can have no win-
ner."); ALDISERT, supra note 172, at 227-28 (1990).
176. See G. Fred Metos, Appellate Advocacy: Practical and Ethical Considerations in
Arguing Case Law, 23 CHAMPION 45 (1999).
177. Blumoff, supra note 175, 561 n.109.
178. See REYNoLDs, supra note 172, at 69; see also KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COM-
MON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960).
179. SeeJoseph Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas
Court of Appeals, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 126, 128 (1999) (arguing that use of
string citations to overwhelm counterarguments is not likely to succeed); see also id.
(explaining "aesthetic counting"-"The idea that if enough cases are tossed at the
reader he or she will simply capitulate under the sheer burden of authority.").
180. See Andrew Baida, Developments and Practice Notes: Writing a Better Brief- The
Civil Appeals Style Manual of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General, 3 J. APP. PRAc.
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they may be used more readily,181 but opinions do not normally attempt
to go beyond the case at hand. Justice Brown did have pretensions to
scholarship-producing a book of cases on Admiralty and teaching at Ge-
orgetown Law School. Nevertheless, his use of the string citation was more
likely a product of beliefs about appropriate judicial decision-making than
an attempt at erudition.
2. Evoking Values of Stability and Predictability in the Law (Stare Decisis)
Justice Brown had a higher rate of using citations than most of the
other justices of the Fuller Court. 182 Precedent itself may justify a deci-
sion, and Justice Brown often wrote opinions that were based on prece-
dent. No one pretended that the issue in Plessy had been previously
decided by the Supreme Court, but there are good reasons to follow the
decisions of other courts when those decisions are consistent, even where
they are in different or inferior jurisdictions.
Every opinion could theoretically engage in an elaborate discussion to
demonstrate that its result is correct without reference to other deci-
sions-but why reinvent the wheel? Where other judges have considered
an issue and reached a reasoned conclusion, a later judge may appropri-
ately cite the prior decisions as the basis for her subsequent conclusion to
follow them. Rather than increasing the length of the opinion, the string
citation may condense it by indicating that the reasons for decision may be
readily found in the prior cases.
1 83
Further, the existence of widespread agreement on the appropriate
resolution of an issue is itself evidence of the correctness of the resolution.
The more people that come to the same conclusion, the more likely it is
that the reasoning was persuasive. The judge who disagrees is likely to
face accusations of imposing his or her own subjective values rather than
engaging in an objective weighing of the arguments. In effect, the deci-
sions create a burden on both judge and advocate to justify a different
conclusion with even greater persuasiveness than would be necessary if
there were no other decisions.
& PROCEss 685, 725 (2001); see also Bruce M. Selya, In Search of Less, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1279 (1996).
181. See also DuVivier, String Citations-Part I, supra note 174, at 83 ("Because
law review articles attempt to be comprehensive in this way, string citations are the
rule, rather than the exception, in the law review context.").
182. See Walter Pratt, Rhetorical Styles on the Fuller Court, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
189, 191-92, 197 (1980). "Brown's reliance upon historical scholarship links him
to Holmes and Gray. All three felt that precedent provided sufficient justification
for a decision; all three reflected their respect for state government by citing a
large number of state cases in their opinions." Id. at 201.
183. One reason why Constitutional Law treatises and texts so often begin
with the Marshall Court decisions is that those opinions give rationales for the
powers of different institutions of government, and later decisions simply cite to
the earlier case rather than engaging in a new examination of the issues. Even
when there is a new examination, it is likely to proceed from assumptions of the
prior case.
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Widespread agreement on a principle evidenced by decisions of vari-
ous courts creates an expectation in those subject to the law that other
courts will reach the same decision. Individuals are therefore likely to
base their behavior on that expectation. This in turn creates a further
reason for courts to follow the decisions of other courts.
Justice Brown used the string citation of transport cases to create a
presumption in favor of the separate but equal principle. He stated that
other courts had reached the same decision, so a departure from that
principle would require unusual justification. Strategically, the string cita-
tion invoked the values of stability and predictability in support of the
opinion.
The string citation indicated that the result was consistent with prior
law and therefore should not occasion any particular notice. Indeed, that
happened in Plessy, and as one scholar notes, "The Plessy v. Ferguson deci-
sion caused scarcely a ripple when it was announced on May 18, 1896."184
It was the use of Plessy as precedent in later decisions that gave it
prominence.
3. Objectify Decision as Found Law
In the eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone said that the law
existed from the history and customs of the people and the judge merely
found it. He described judges as "the oracles of the law."1 85 They could,
of course, get it wrong, but it was an objective reality. In this view, the
decisions of multiple judges in multiple jurisdictions were persuasive evi-
dence that the law had been "found" correctly.
In 1890 the declaratory view of the law was still a powerful force.' 8 6
The Judge was to be divorced from politics, and legal reasoning was its
own unique form of reasoning. Indeed, it remains a powerful notion to-
day that judges must derive their opinions and values from neutral objec-
tive sources and not from their own subjective views. The ideal of
objectivity, however much derided as impossible, played a large role in the
way in which judges wrote their opinions in the nineteenth century. In
this respect, Justice Brown's use of the string citation deliberately played to
this line of thought.
By attributing the legal principle to other judges and other courts, the
Supreme Court Justice can claim that he is merely declaring what the law
184. See HARvEy FIRESIDE, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: HOMER PLESSY AND THE SU-
PREME COURT DECISION THAT LEGALIZED RACISM 222 (2004). There were a number
of articles about the Plessy decision, particularly in the black community, but the
N.Y. Times relegated the story to page 3 of its second section, and critical objec-
tions echoed Harlan's dissent rather than claiming any departure from precedent.
Id. at 222-29.
185. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWNS OF EN-
GLAND (1765-1769) 69 (1862).
186. SeeJAMES C. CARTER, THE IDEAL AND THE AcruAL IN THE LAw 10 (Dando
1890) ("That the judge cannot make law is accepted from the start.").
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is. The extent to which that law reflects the customs and mores of the
people of the United States supports the correctness of the determina-
tion. 18 7 The judge is responsible for finding the law, but the string cita-
tion is strong evidence that he has discovered it correctly. One virtue to
the author of the opinion is that the law takes on an impersonal face-it is
not the subjective view of Henry Billings Brown that segregation is natural
and appropriate, but he has discovered that it is the custom and principle
of the society in which he lives.
B. Challenge to the Accuracy of the String Citation Unlikely
None of the benefits of string citation can be attained if the reader
understands that the cases are misstated. Justice Brown could not avoid
the responsibility for his decision and invoke the values of stability and
predictability if his string citation was challenged and the challenger
demonstrated that the cases do not support what he said. Therefore, if he
expected the citation would be carefully scrutinized, he might not have
put it in. Nevertheless, he had reason to believe that his string citation
would not be questioned. First, similar statements in the A&E Encyclope-
dia aroused no criticism, and a similar use of precedent in the Louisiana
Court had evoked no response. Second, demonstration that any case was
incorrectly cited would not significantly advance the case against segrega-
tion. The heart of the argument was not precedent, so it was not worth
the effort to attempt to refute what appeared to be a side show. Finally,
there were a variety of reasons for conflating the common carrier cases
with the command of the constitution and those reasons contributed to
the confidence ofJustice Brown that the string citation would pass without
contradiction.
1. Prior Misstatements Unchallenged
The proposition that authority supported the constitutionality of state
carrier segregation laws runs through the case. Counsel for Ferguson
cited the A&E Encyclopedia to this effect in his brief to the Supreme
Court.188 Justice Fenner's opinion for the Louisiana Supreme Court indi-
cated that authority supported the proposition, concluding after citing
cases that:
They all accord in the general principle that in such matters
equality and not identity or community of accommodations is the
extreme test of conformity to the requirements of the XIV
amendment.
187. See Kunal M. Parker, Context in History and Law: A Study of the Late Nine-
teenth-Century American Jurisprudence of Custom, 24 LAW AND HIsT. REV. 473 (2006)
(noting that late nineteenth century saw development as well as seeds of opposi-
tion to "jurisprudence of custom").
188. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 116-17.
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. . . . The cogency of the reasons on which this principle is
founded perhaps accounts for the singular fact that notwith-
standing the general prevalence throughout the country of such
statutes and regulations and the frequency of decisions maintain-
ing them no one has yet undertaken to submit the question to
the final arbitrament of the Supreme Court of the United
States. 1
89
Nevertheless, none of the briefs on behalf of Plessy challenged this
claim. S.F. Phillips and F.D. McKenny filed a short brief as attorneys on
behalf of Homer Plessy. They argued that his right as a citizen of the
United States to travel was a privilege that was abridged by separation of
the races and that separation was an injury to that right regardless of
which race received the better accommodations or even if the accommo-
dations were the same. This brief did not mention any cases that the
Court used in its string cite.
James Walker and Albion Tourgee also filed a brief "of counsel" for
Plessy that gave a detailed statement of the case. Tourgee argued that
Strauder v. West Virginia19 ° demonstrated that discrimination by the state
was forbidden. His strongest argument was that the Louisiana law "comes
squarely within the exception made in the Civil Rights Cases; it is a statute
expressly ordained by State legislation and carried into effect by State
agencies and tribunals." 19 1 Tourgee admitted that Louisville192 held that
the state could compel railroads to provide separate cars, but noted that
the case did not decide whether individuals could be compelled to use the
separate coaches. Walker focused on the problems of defining a person as
white.
However, in all the arguments by Plessy's counsel before the Supreme
Court, not one reference is made to any of the string cite cases. Walker
had shown in his brief to the Louisiana State Supreme Court that he rec-
ognized that the cases mentioned in Ferguson's opinion did not involve
state laws, but he focused the argument to the United States Supreme
Court on principle rather than precedent. Thus, the Supreme Court did
not have any brief in Plessy to point out the distinction between carrier
common law obligations and the issue before them on the constitutional-
ity of state law.
The plaintiff lawyers' failure to challenge the claim of precedent
when they had the opportunity in their briefs suggested that they would
not do so after the case was decided. Similarly, there were no challenges
to the authority of the Encyclopedia.
189. Id. at 128.
190. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
191. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 52.
192. Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 589, 597 (1890).
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2. Challenge Fails to Threaten the Decision
More importantly, Justice Brown could see that no one had reason to
challenge the assertion that authority upheld the constitutionality of car-
rier segregation laws. That one or two of the cases did not support the
statement would hardly affect the strength of the case. But a challenge to
all authority requires the reader to run through all twelve cases, many of
which had not even been mentioned in the litigation. Readers had little
reason to suspect that none of the cases actually supported the statement.
Reading each case would appear to be a waste of time-because it was
likely that they would confirm the common perception that they sup-
ported segregation laws as illustrated by the Encyclopedia and Judge Fen-
ner's opinion.
Even if the reader were skeptical of the citation and did, like this arti-
cle, run through each of the dozen cases, it would not change the out-
come. The cases did not suggest that segregation was unconstitutional.
Many of them expressed approval for separating the races. There seems
to be no payoff in legal doctrine for a demonstration that the cases did not
technically uphold the constitutionality of statutes. Even if someone knew
that the citations were inaccurate, no audience would care enough about
it to justify publication of the critique. Since there was little incentive to
pursue the inquiry, Justice Brown could rest assured that his string citation
would be left alone (at least until after his death, when Plessy would eventu-
ally come under direct attack).
C. Belief the Principles Were the Same and the Distinction Too Fine
Justice Brown may well have believed that objections to his string cita-
tion would be mere quibbles. He could find support in briefs, treatises
and in the opinion below for the proposition that the common law princi-
ples were the same as the Fourteenth Amendment. Morse's brief said the
reasoning in the common law cases supported the conclusion that the stat-
ute was proper. 193 The A&E Encyclopedia footnote to the statement that
regulation of civil rights was a proper subject for the state's police power
asserted "the same principle has been upheld" in four of the cases men-
tioned in the string cite. 194 Judge Fenner's opinion similarly asserted that
the principles were the same. The text mentioned "regulations made by
carriers" and referenced decisions to the effect that regulations enforcing
segregation "do not... contravene the Fourteenth Amendment." 195 Fen-
ner cited the same four cases for "the general principle that.., equality
193. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 248.
194. See A&E ENCYC. L., supra note 152, at 754 n.2, 755. For a discussion of
the A&E ENCLYC. L.'s mention of cases in the string citation, see supra notes 156-
158 and accompanying text.
195. Ex parte Homer A. Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (1892).
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and not identity or community of accommodations is the extreme test of
conformity to the requirements of the XIV Amendment."'
96
There were a variety of reasons that so many viewed the common law
principle as a constitutional one. The critical language used by the courts
for applying the Fourteenth Amendment and the common law principle
was the same. The equality component of the common law rule was devel-
oped in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. The carrier itself had a
unique public status, and the equality principle was viewed as particularly
stringent in the case law. Finally, the constitutional principle that the
courts used in anti-miscegenation law cases was consistent with the carrier
cases.
1. The Shift from Privileges and Immunities to Equal Protection
Both the common law and the language of the Constitution required
the decision-maker to whom the rules applied to provide equality. The
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the state from denying the "equal"
protection of the law, while the common law principle insisted that carri-
ers provide "equal" accommodation. The use of the same word in both
contexts-"equal"-led to the assumption that it meant the same thing.
The argument that all persons were entitled to identical rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment has strong roots in history, but judicial deci-
sions shifting the focus of the Amendment from privileges and immunities
to equal protection opened the way to confusion. African-American rights
were to be secured largely through a Privileges and Immunities Clause
that would guarantee them identical rights to those held by white citizens.
The notion of identical rights was at the heart of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Sameness, not equality, was the test. And that Act was the basis for
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. But people can only have "iden-
tical" rights in the abstract. In the concrete situation, they must have dif-
ferent things. The shift from reliance on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases to the use
of equal protection in Strauder led the Court to believe "equal" in the Con-
stitution had the same sense as "equal" in the requirements of the com-
mon law. The Court in Plessy turned the abstract right to be treated
identically with whites into the concrete right to have a particular seat that
was substantially equal to that of whites.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Derivation from the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Emphasized Privileges and Immunities
The Congress that wrote the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Section One of that Act provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared
196. Id.
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46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/1
PLESSVS STRING CITATION
to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
19 7
The Fourteenth Amendment reflected the Act-opening with a dec-
laration of citizenship for persons born in the United States and then
prohibiting states from denying them certain rights. The Act insisted that
all citizens shall have the same right as white citizens to contract, to court
access, to possession and transfer of property, and to "full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." The
idea that specific rights should also have added to them equal benefit for
security of person and property seems to reflect the separate clauses of
section one of the Amendment, which states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
198
Congressmen proclaimed that the Amendment simply enacted the
statute into the Constitution. 199 There is a very good argument that they
understood the privileges and immunities of citizens to refer to the same
privileges and immunities that were in Article IV of the Constitution, and
that they included rights to contract and to own property. 200 Article IV
protected residents of other states from discrimination in state laws on
property and contract, and Fourteenth Amendment citizenship could be
interpreted to forbid the use of race to distinguish between individuals
197. 1866 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27-30 (1866) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2004)).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
199. See BOGEN, PRRILEGES & IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 49 (2003); see also
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at 2498 (Congressman Broomall); CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 15, at 2514 (Congressman Raymond).
200. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at 2539 (Farnsworth); see also CONG.
GLOBE, supra note 15, at 2459 (Stevens); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at 265 (How-
ard); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at 2962 (Poland); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15,
at 3035 (Henderson).
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with respect to the rights, "privileges, and immunities" they had under
state law.
20 1
3. Slaughterhouse Cases Nullifies Privileges and Immunities Arguments
Plessy's attorneys, Tourgee and Walker, tried to argue that privileges
and immunities were the natural rights of citizens and that Louisiana law
violated these rights. 202 Nevertheless, this argument was blocked by the
Slaughterhouse Cases.2 0 3 That case held that the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States were distinct from the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the states, and only the former were protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Contract and property rights were the latter.
Regulation of the contract of carriage was a matter for state law, and not a
privilege of citizens of the United States.
The Slaughterhouse Cases20 4 ended the effective use of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause to argue for equality.20 5 Nevertheless, it was obvi-
ous from both the history and the statements of the Court that the
Amendment must have had some ability to prevent discrimination.
20 6
With privileges and immunities sterilized, the court turned to the Equal
Protection Clause.
4. Equality Discussions Found in Common Carrier Cases
The Equal Protection Clause looks like a variant of the requirement
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that all citizens have "full and equal benefit
201. SeeJohn Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L.J. 1385 (1992); see also generally WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
202. See generally Brief of Tourgee, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134.
203. 83 U.S. 36, 57 (1873).
204. Id.
205. Phillips and McKenney argued that segregation abridged a privilege or
immunity of United States citizenship, namely, the right to travel. They argued
that travel, unlike marriage or education, was a privilege of federal rather than
state citizenship, citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 83 (1868). They pointed to
R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445 (1873), to argue that separation of the races in-
flicted an injury, so that they reasoned that segregation constituted a burden on
travel forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court had already struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 U.S. Stat.
335, §§ 1, 2 (1875), which prohibited discrimination in public conveyances, as be-
yond the power of Congress. See generally Civil Rights Act Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
The Court held open the possibility that the Act would be constitutional as applied
to interstate public conveyances, but that implied the Act would not be constitu-
tional as applied to intrastate travel. If the federal government lacked power to
regulate intrastate travel, the court would be unlikely to hold that state regulation
of it violated a federal right. The Plessy Court's insistence that segregation was not
an injury except in the mind of the plaintiff was also a partial answer to the privi-
leges and immunities argument. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
Travel was regulated, but no burden was put upon it that would prevent anyone
from traveling. A tax could prevent someone lacking money from reaching fed-
eral offices-a different seat in the same conveyance would not.
206. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880).
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of all laws and proceedings for security of person and property."20 7 On its
face, "equal protection" appears to simply guarantee that the tort and
criminal law protections against assault and robbery that keep the person
and property of white citizens secure will apply equally to non-whites.
Laws that enforce agreements or distribute goods or services-i.e. contract
rights and rights to acquire or sell real or personal property-look more
like privileges than protections of the law. The Court needed to expand
the Equal Protection Clause to deal with the kind of discrimination that
the framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to stop.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,20 8 the Court held that exclusion of blacks
from the grand jury violated the Equal Protection Clause. Subsequent his-
tory has shown that a broad reading of equal protection may deal with all
the problems that the framers intended.20 9 The problem in 1896, how-
ever, was that the use of the Equal Protection Clause shifted attention
from the requirements of "same rights" to that of "equality." Justice
Strong's opinion in Strauder used the Equal Protection Clause to require
identity in rights:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the
same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States,
and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall
be made against them by law because of their color?2 10
Strauder showed that a court could use the "equal protection clause"
to require identical rights, but it involved a total exclusion and thus was
not a holding on whether separate but equal accommodations satisfied
equality. That issue was not confronted until Plessy.
Plessy's lawyers paid scant attention to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment in their arguments. Tourgee and Walker as-
signed five errors-four relating to interpretations by the court below and
one rooted in the unconstitutionality of the statute. They offered twelve
reasons for the latter. The first ground was that the statute imposed a
badge of servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and that
discrimination abridged the rights privileges and immunities of citizens on
account of race and color. The fourth ground argued that the statute
does not extend equal protection of laws and violated due process, but the
equal protection argument seemed tied to the exemption in the statute
207. 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27-30, Apr. 10, 1866 A.D. Chap. XXXI.
208. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
209. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 IHASTINGS L.J.
333, 391 (2003).
210. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
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for nurses attending to children of the other race. The rest of the argu-
ments stressed due process contentions.
2 1
'
The Supreme Court had little prior experience with "equality" be-
yond Strauder. The common carrier cases had insisted that "equality is not
identity." Without an alternative articulation of equality, the Court was
tempted to use the common law definition for the constitutional
principle.
5. The Fourteenth Amendment's Effect on the Common Law
The common carrier cases began with a test of reasonableness.
Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, some courts consid-
ered racially discriminatory laws to be reasonable even though they ex-
cluded African-Americans from sheltered areas of the carrier.21 2 When
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, however, the various courts con-
cluded that it was unreasonable to use race to deny persons substantially
equal accommodations. 21 3 The Amendment did not apply to carriers di-
rectly because it only limited the actions of the state, but it destroyed the
foundations for discrimination. If African-Americans were citizens, they
were entitled to rights. If the law was to treat them equally, it suggested a
general understanding that unequal treatment was inappropriate. Some-
times courts were explicit in declaring that prior reasoning had been over-
turned by the Amendment.2 14 Even if the judge did not make direct
211. The due process ground focused on the improper discretion given to
the conductor to determine race and the possibility of lacking a remedy for incor-
rect determinations. This was the basis for arguments 2, 3 and 8-12.
2) statute doesn't enforce substantial equality; 3) statute allows octaroons
to be classed as non white; ... 8) statute deprives citizens of remedy for
wrong; 9) improper delegation to conductor of definition of persons of
color; 10) common carriers cannot be authorized to distinguish accord-
ing to race; 11) race is question of law that officer of railroad cannot
consider; and 12) state cannot authorize conductor to make determina-
tion of race without testimony.
See generally id. There was also a claim of violation of natural right in separating
married couples who were of different races, and a generic argument that the
statute was not in the interest of public order "5) statute is not in interest of public
order but directed against citizens of colored race; ... 7) the statute is a violation
of the natural and absolute rights of citizens of the United States to society and
protection of their wives and children." See generally id.
212. See, e.g., Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 527-28 (1858) (discussing reasonable-
ness of rule).
213. See W. McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639, 641 (1889) (discussing equality in
accommodations); Houck v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 F. 226, 229 (1886) (same); Log-
wood v. Memphis & C. R.R. Co., 23 F. 318, 319 (1885) (same); The Sue, 22 F. 843,
846 (1885) (same); Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 I11. 185, 189 (1870)
(same); Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 214 (1867) (same).
214. See Thompson v. Balt. City Passenger Ry., 23 F. Cas. 1023 (D. Md. 1870);
Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 364 (1890) (discussing how Constitution gave Afri-
can Americans full citizenship). Judge Giles' remarks are reported in Baltimore
City Passenger Railway: Who Shall Ride in the Cars? Test Case in United States Circuit
Court, BALT. Am. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1870, at 1.
460
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reference to the Amendment, it was apparent that it had an effect. Carri-
ers could not reasonably refuse to furnish first class accommodations to
citizens who were willing to pay the first class fare.215
The use of the Fourteenth Amendment in the carrier cases as evi-
dence of what was "reasonable" explains the Louisiana Supreme Court's
reference to decisions that "regulations enforcing the separation of the
races in public conveyances .... so long at least as the facilities or accom-
modations provided are substantially equal, do not abridge any privilege
or immunity of citizens or otherwise contravene the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."216 Of course the carrier's rules could not violate the constitutional
prohibition against state behavior, but they might be contrary to the prin-
ciple of equality contained in the Amendment. Because common law de-
cisions based on that principle prohibited unequal treatment, permission
for racial separation in those decisions suggested that those courts be-
lieved segregation by carriers was consistent with the principle of equality
found in the Amendment.
6. The Substantive Due Process Reasonableness Standard
Another factor that led the Court to believe that the common law
principle was the same as the constitutional command was the use of the
idea of reasonableness in both situations. The litigation in Plessy involved
the impact of the law on an individual, but the law also regulated the rail-
road. Plessy could contend that the law violated equal protection as to
him, but the railroad was treated equally with other railroads. Thus, the
application of the law to the railroad could more easily be challenged as
an improper restriction of its interest in managing its own property. The
Court began to talk after the Civil War about private businesses that were
"affected with a public interest," or property devoted to a use in which the
public had an interest.2 17 Such businesses could be regulated, but the
regulation must be reasonable or it would be a deprivation of property
without due process. 21 8 That argument was made in People v King,21 9
where the owners of the skating rink argued that an anti-discrimination
law deprived them of their property without due process. The due process
challenge did not compare the property to the rights of others, but simply
used the reasonableness of the law as its basic criteria. The New York
215. The Sue, 22 F. at 848.
216. Ex parte Homer A. Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (1893).
217. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127 (1877).
218. See id. at 134 (noting that common law right of property cannot be taken
away without due process). Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890) (holding company deprived of ability to charge reasonable rates for use of
property is deprived of property without due process); cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887) (states depriving person of property without due process of law
constitutes grounds for federal jurisdiction).
219. See People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 424 (1888) (discussing limitations of
state police power concerning deprivation of private property without due
process).
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courts upheld the law as a reasonable regulation of a business affected
with a public interest because the rink was open to the public.
Since business regulations were usually challenged on the grounds of
reasonableness, the common carrier decisions that held racial separation
by the steamboat was reasonable appeared to resolve the question whether
requiring carriers to separate the races would be reasonable. Further,
since they also found reasonableness required equal accommodations as a
result of the Fourteenth Amendment, they seemed to resolve questions of
whether separate accommodations could be equal as well. If equality is an
aspect of reasonableness, a reasonable regulation satisfies the require-
ments of equality. Thus, the standards of reasonableness and equality be-
came virtually indistinguishable. 220
When Plessy's counsel argued that separate accommodations would
lead to separation in everything, the Court replied that "every exercise of
the police power must be reasonable." 22 1 Indeed, Justice Brown made
reasonableness rather than equality the test for compliance with the Four-
teenth Amendment:
So far, then as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is con-
cerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute
of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this
there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the
legislature. 22 2
The focus on reasonableness of regulation echoed both the common
carrier doctrine and due process decisions of the Court. Common carrier
cases developed a separate but equal doctrine out of a requirement that
public conveyances act reasonably in making rules for their passengers. 223
The Court virtually reversed the process in Plessy, making a "reasonable-
ness" test out of a command of equality. In doing so, the Court may have
been influenced by its due process decisions. In any event, the use of the
same vocabulary led courts to perceive that the Constitution imposed the
same limit as the common law.
7. The Public Status of Carners
Carriers had unique obligations under the common law. They were
not merely "affected with a public interest" but were viewed as public enti-
ties, although not governmental bodies. The common law rules that iden-
tified carriers as public entities could be overcome by statute, but that just
220. The perception that due process includes equality became embedded in
law in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Id. at 500 (holding Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause prohibited the federal government from segregating
schools in District of Columbia).
221. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
222. Id.
223. For a discussion of Day v. Owen, see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying
text.
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made the common law requirement of equality look like the limit to which
the principle could be pushed.
a. The Obligation Demonstrates the Special Status of Carriers
The common law treated common carriers as exceptional. Justice
Holmes protested against the rules of strict liability for common carriers in
the book, The Common Law.2 24 He complained that there was no reason to
impose such liability only on carriers, attributing the policy anomaly to the
eighteenth century decision ofJustice Holt. But the criticism simply high-
lighted the special legal status of carriers, and a strong sense of reverence
for custom and for the common law in the late nineteenth century helped
preserve its unique place in the law.
Over the centuries, since the beginning of the common carrier doc-
trine in England, the doctrine's focus shifted from protecting customers
from harm to the public nature of the occupation.2 25 This helped lead to
the historically incorrect assumption that the obligations of the common
carrier existed because of a unique status as a "public" occupation. 226 The
"public" business was a step beyond merely "affected with a public inter-
est;" even the defendant's attorneys in King assumed that regulation of
carriers was appropriate for government.
Because the obligations of the common carrier stemmed from their
status rather than contract or statute, they could be viewed as part of the
background for evaluating actions of public entities. That could lead to
confusion between the government and the "public" business. Limits on
the latter were even more powerful because the common law commanded
it even without legislation. To the extent that people envisioned the com-
mon law as arising from society, the principle itself seemed
fundamental. 227
b. Common Law Equality Obligations Stricter than Statutes
Most of the statutes and ordinances in cases cited in the Plessy briefs
and opinions involved school segregation. Unlike carriers, school opera-
tions were more likely to be governed primarily by statute rather than the
common law. Parents and students attacked school segregation in part
because it forced them to go further from home. Courts responded that
224. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 160-61 (M.Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the
Common Law, 13 Am. U. L. REV. 609, 630 (1879) (discussing imposition of strict
liability on common carriers).
225. See Bogen, Innkeeper's Tale, supra note 38, at 52-53, 91 (discussing devel-
opment of theory of public accommodation).
226. See id. at 52 (citing Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of
Public Service Companies (Part I), 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 515-16 (1911)).
227. See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 1 (1977) (discussing conception of common law in early American
society).
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separation was consistent with equality, and that the greater distance that
African-American children had to travel was merely an incident of having
separate schools. 228 Other than distance, plaintiffs did not focus on ine-
quality in the schools, and the courts usually did not stress it.
The courts in carrier cases focused more on equality in facilities
under the common law than under statutes, invalidating segregation
where equal facilities were not provided. 229 Statutes tempered this obliga-
tion by stressing separation. Indeed, the first Tennessee carrier statute
simply removed the common law obligation. 230 The later segregation stat-
utes established the standard for the railroad's obligation to provide equal
accommodations. 23' Under that standard, the court reversed the lower
court's finding of inequality in Wells. 232 Thus, statutory equality require-
ments appeared to be weaker than the common law.
To the extent that counsel argued segregation statutes were constitu-
tional, the cases upholding racial separation under a common law stan-
dard then seemed to be paradigms of the standard for equality. Indeed,
counsel in Plessy suggested that the carrier's common law obligations were
stricter than the constitutional limits on the state. In his brief to the Loui-
siana Supreme Court, District Attorney Adams asserted that state statutes
could regulate local carriage with respect to separation of the races, ad-
ding: "even in the absence of any legislation on the subject the common
carrier was at liberty to adopt in reference thereto such reasonable regula-
tions as the common law allows." 2 33 Alexander Porter Morse similarly inti-
mated in his brief to the United States Supreme Court that the legal
hurdles for segregation were higher for carriers under the common law
than the constitutional hurdles for segregation statutes. He stated that
courts held laws requiring segregation were justified. Then, he said:
"[a] nd the weight of authority seems to support the doctrine that, to some
extent at least and under some circumstances, such a separation is allowa-
228. See Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (1890) (finding further dis-
tance black children have to travel to school inconvenient, but not grounds for
complaint); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 337, 364 (1874) (finding even if trustees of
school system failed to provide equal funds to educate African-American children,
remedy is to compel them to do so rather than to integrate existing school); State
v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871) (maintaining segregated schools); see also
People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 457 (1883) (holding segregated schools did not
violate equal protection); Bertonneau v. Dir., 3 Fed. Cas. 294, 296 (C.D. La. 1878)
(holding state has right to manage schools and maintain segregation in manner
that will promote the interest of all); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 57 (1874) (finding
segregation permissible where separate schools maintained).
229. See, e.g., The Sue, 22 F. 843, 848 (1885) (finding racial segregation on
common carrier cannot be upheld unless it can be proved that separation is free
from any actual discrimination in comfort or appearance of inferiority).
230. See Acts of the State of Tenn., 1875, pp. 216-17.
231. See generally WELes, supra note 89.
232. See id.
233. Brief of Lionel Adams for Respondent, at 27, Ex parte Homer A. Plessy,
No. 11134 (La. Dec. 1892) (emphasis added).
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ble at common law." 2 34 Even Tourgee, arguing for Plessy in the Louisiana
Supreme Court, saw the statute as an attempt to overcome the require-
ments of common law, which had led to victory for numbers of plaintiffs:
"Act No. 111 of 1890 is an ineffectual attempt to protect the railroads from
a similar misadventure." 23 5
The reverence for custom and the common law in the late nineteenth
century also contributed to the perception that the common law test for
equality was appropriate for the Constitution. Although strong forces at-
tacked classical legal thought, the Legal Realists had yet to make their ap-
pearance. Thus, there was popular support for a historical view of the law
as based on the customs of the people and for custom as the basic glue for
society. 2 36 Since the common law standard appeared more protective
than statutes, it was particularly likely to be viewed as a paradigm for equal-
ity. Thus, Justice Fenner's opinion for the Supreme Court of Louisiana
insisted that cases like Logwood and The Sue accord in the general principle
that equality and not identity of accommodations is the test of conformity
to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D. Consequences of Equality as Identity: The Common Carrier Challenge to
Identity Analysis in Miscegenation Cases
Transportation segregation was not critical to the racial hierarchy of
the late nineteenth century. A different decision in Plessy would have left
private segregation intact. The threat came from the potential effect on
interracial marriage. Identical rights and equivalent rights were compet-
ing visions of equality. Each vision seemed consistent with anti-miscegena-
tion laws-as long as the right was characterized as the right to marry
someone of one's own race. This narrow notion of a right, however, could
not be applied in the transportation context. The inability to describe a
right in racial terms undermined the argument that anti-miscegenation
laws were constitutional. Thus, the Court needed to use equivalence
rather than identity of rights in order to preserve its position on miscege-
nation.237 Since a majority was convinced that anti-miscegenation laws
were constitutional, they understood the constitutional principle was the
substantial equivalence understanding of the common law rule.
234. LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 134, at 148.
235. Brief of Relator for Writs of Prohibition and Certiorari to the Judge of
Section A Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Albion W. Tourgee
andJas. C. Walker, at 22 (Nov. 30, 1892)
236. HOROWITZ, supra note 227, at 118-23 (discussing philosophy of James C.
Carter in opposing codification movement).
237. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (discussing how increased
penalty for fornication if parties are of different races is constitutional because
punishment for crime of interracial sex is same for both races).
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1. Right Defined as Marriage to Member of Prospective Spouse's Race
Few people were willing to challenge the anti-miscegenation laws of
the time. 23 8 Opponents of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment had raised the issue of miscegenation to scare proponents of
antidiscrimination legislation,2 39 but proponents responded that there
was no denial of equality-both the white and the black individual were
forbidden to marry.240 In other words, the right at issue was characterized
as a right to marry someone of the same race. By characterizing the right
in racial terms-the right to attend school with persons of the same race,
to marry someone of the same race, or to travel on public conveyances
with persons of the same race-it was possible to argue that segregation
laws provided the "same" rights as those afforded to white citizens.
The argument that segregation provided the same right had been ef-
fective for marriage, but it was weaker with respect to services. The "same"
right results in integration when the politically dominant race is unwilling
to be totally separated. Because whites were eager to employ black labor
and buy property owned by blacks, or to sell real or personal property to
blacks, the "same" right allowed blacks to contract across the races. Thus,
the requirement of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that all citizens have the
same right to contract and own property as white citizens generally, effec-
tively precluded racial lines in those areas. Only when the dominant polit-
ical group desired separation did it make a difference whether equality
meant identical rights or only equivalents.
2. Transport in Same Circumstances as Other Members of Race Is Not Equal
Common carriers responded to a push for segregation. Their regula-
tion highlighted the difficulties of a racially defined right. When rights
238. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896). Justice Brown noted in
Plessy that laws forbidding racial intermarriage "have been universally recognized
as within the police power of the State." Id.
239. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at S. 505-06 (Johnson); CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 15, at S. 598 (Davis); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at H. 632 (Thorn-
ton); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at H. app. 134 (Rogers) (explaining 14th
Amendment privileges and immunities); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at H. 1121
(Rogers) (discussing Civil Rights Bill).
240. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at S. 322, 420, 600 (Trumbull) (urging pas-
sage of Freedmen's Bureau Bill, Trumbull refers to prior statements when defend-
ing Civil Rights Bill); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at S. 505 (Fessenden)
(supporting passage of Civil Rights Bill); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 15, at H. 632
(Moulton) (same). PresidentJohnson's Veto Message on the Civil Rights Act indi-
cated that the bill would not preclude anti-miscegenation laws. See CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 15, at S. 1680; see also Pace, 106 U.S. at 585 (finding statute mandating
increased penalty for interracial sex constitutional). In upholding the statute pun-
ishing intermarriage and punishing interracial sexual activity more strongly than
interracial acts, the Court said, "[w]hatever discrimination is made in the punish-
ment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offence designated and
not against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each
offending person, whether white or black, is the same." Id.
[Vol. 52: p. 411
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are described racially, the "same" rights often produce very unequal con-
crete results that cannot satisfy a requirement of equality. The cases de-
manding equal accommodations on public conveyances made clear that
separation of the races alone could not be considered to provide "equal"
rights. Common carrier plaintiffs insisted on facilities equal in comfort to
those afforded white passengers, not on abstract notions of sameness.
241
Courts understood that the "right" in common carrier litigation was a
right to sit in the conveyance rather than a right to sit with someone of
one's own race. Excluding African-Americans from sitting in the covered
portion of a carrier was transparently unequal, even if all African-Ameri-
cans sat outside and all others sat inside. Once the Court looked to the
concrete nature of the right, it had to broaden the definition of the right
to obtain equality; however, the "same" right to sit on public conveyances
that white persons had would preclude the use of race in seating rules.
Segregation could be justified only if equality did not require identity in
rights.
With respect to miscegenation, the Court initially seemed to define
equal rights as equal rights to sexual relations within the race (as defined
by the court or the state), 242 but ultimately the Court recognized that the
African-American did not have the same right as the white to marry a
white person. 2 43 The carrier cases suggested the difficulty of defining the
right racially. Additionally, they provided a mechanism for continuing to
uphold anti-miscegenation laws. Even if the rights were different, it could
be argued that the restrictions on marriage for whites (cannot marry Afri-
can-Americans) were substantially equal to those on African-Americans
(cannot marry whites). In citing the dozen cases on public conveyances,
the Court insisted that the Constitutional command was for "equality"
rather than "sameness" of rights. In short, it hid the argument that
"equal" had a very different understanding for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment and common carrier law.
E. The Difference in Principles
Justice Brown saw no difference in principle between the common
law obligations of carriers and the command of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. He probably felt that objections to his fusion would be mere techni-
cal quibbles. It would have diluted the strength of his appeal to existing
norms to elaborate on the cases, but it would not have changed the out-
come in Plessy.
241. African-American individuals objected to the use of race in any fashion,
but legal cases were primarily fashioned on a separate but equal theory. See gener-
ally WELLS, supra note 89.
242. See Pace, 106 U.S. at 585 (upholding statute punishing interracial sexual
relations).
243. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding freedom to marry
person of another race cannot be infringed upon by states).
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With hindsight, there are many objections that could be raised to us-
ing the common law principle as a constitutional norm. It does make a
difference whether the issue is the limit on decisions made by a private
carrier or a public entity. Appropriate reasoning for common carriers
may not be appropriate for the government. Equality under the common
law presents a different context than constitutional equality.
It may be reasonable for a carrier to separate the races to increase the
number of customers who would like to use its services. The carrier's ra-
tional goal is to maximize its income. Nevertheless, maximizing the car-
rier's income is not an appropriate goal for government. Whether it is
reasonable for the government to require the carrier to treat citizens dif-
ferently, therefore, is a very different issue from the reasonableness of the
carrier's decision.
Carriers have a traditional property right in their vehicles and control
over them. Courts have long acknowledged that the carrier's right to de-
cide where passengers must sit is subject to a reasonableness requirement.
Satisfaction of the desires of its customers is a carrier's function, and it
must do so to enhance its revenues. But customers do not care whether
persons separated from them get equally comfortable seats. The fare
charged by the carrier is sufficient to build and maintain first class facili-
ties, so customers willing to pay that fare provide the same economic sup-
port regardless of race. Thus, the Courts found that it was unreasonable
for a carrier under an obligation to take a passenger to provide inferior
facilities to persons paying the same fare. This was true of white customers
as well as black. This notion of equality views the question as one of identi-
fying the physical item the customer paid for. The seller may select the
particular object to deliver from among fungible goods, but the good must
meet standards of equivalence. In the carrier case, neither the white nor
the black passenger had a ight to any specific seat, because the property
ights of the carrier give it control of seating arrangements. In this con-
text, an equal seat is one that is substantially similar to others of that class.
The government has a very different relationship with its citizens in
making statutes than a carrier has to its customers. The government does
not provide in these cases a concrete object like a seat. It provides
through its laws a general abstract ight. Two persons cannot have the
same seat because only one person can sit down in it. Thus, the common
law held that a carrier's obligation to provide equal seating is limited to
substantial equality. Two people may have the same right to a seat, al-
though which seat they get depends on other events-e.g. before the seat
is allocated, both have the same right to a seat, but the particular seat may
depend on whether they are the first to sit in it or whether they get a ticket
naming that seat. All persons have the "same" right to contract, but en-
forcement of the ight depends on whether the parties made a contract.
Thus, equality in the common law context may be concrete and refer to
substantial similarity of physical objects while equality in the constitutional
[Vol. 52: p. 411
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sense refers to whether a classification that distinguishes people is appro-
priate. The Court in Plessy never considered the argument, but we are
gradually understanding why they were wrong.
244
VI. CONCLUSION
This exploration of the string citation of carrier cases in Plessy shows
how the Court confused common law standards with Constitutional princi-
ples. The function of the Fourteenth Amendment was to produce the
same rights for African-Americans as for white citizens. At the same time,
it did not aim to control the behavior of individuals or private organiza-
tions who might seek to separate the races. The rules that were developed
to constrain private choices demonstrated a regard for all people, but did
not insist that there be no separation. They influenced perceptions in the
public arena, but the different context of the common law rules justified a
different understanding for constitutional principle-a difference that the
Court missed in Plessy.
The public-private distinction has been subject to a great deal of at-
tack.2 45 Private centers of power may be as significant to the individual as
public ones.2 46 Corporations and NGOs cross governmental lines and, for
that reason, may be beyond effective control. 247 On the other side, dis-
putes ultimately have the possibility of governmental resolution and take
place in the context of a society with rules largely framed by govern-
244. The Court started down the road focusing on classification by its deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down sepa-
rate but equal doctrine). The Court has been following it ever since in striking
down distinctions based on gender and legitimacy. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding gender based differential in state statute prohibiting
sale of 3.2% beer to males under age of 21 and to females under age of 18 consti-
tuted denial of equal protection); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (hold-
ing denial to illegitimate children right to recover for wrongful death of mother
constituted invidious discrimination).
245. See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 227, at 204-08 (discussing how common
carriers granted power to use notices to claim exemption from liability and how
population was at mercy of carriers as result); HenryJ. Friendly, The Public/Private
Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1982) (discussing
public function doctrine). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action,
80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1983) (discussing issue of infringement of basic rights by
private actors); Louis Jaffe, Law-Making by Private Groups, 51 HAv. L. REv. 201
(1937) (discussing extent to which grant of powers to specific groups, binding on
whole group and effective against public, is within traditions of our legal system).
246. See generally Adolf Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-
Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 933 (1952) (discussing impact of grant of specific legal protections to indi-
viduals in dealings with private units with great economic power).
247. The ability to shift business and activities from one country to another
creates difficulties for nation state regulation. See generally GILES PACQUET, THE
MULTINATIONAL FIRM AND THE NATION STATE (1972); KARL SAUVANT AND FARD
LAviPOUR, CONTROLLING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: PROBLEMS, STRATEGIES,
COUNTERSTRATEGIES (1976).
20071
59
Bogen: Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment.24 8 In that sense, all private actions not prohibited by law may be
thought of as sanctioned by law.
Nevertheless, the history of the Plessy litigation suggests that there is a
useful function in keeping the spheres separate. What is appropriate be-
havior to promote the freedom of association of one group may be en-
tirely inappropriate as a command of government. We may decide that
standards for public life are appropriate for private life as well in specific
cases, but the application should be thoughtful and not automatic.
A related issue is being played out in our state and federal courts. Gay
and lesbian couples seek the same marital rights as heterosexual couples.
The Constitution does not and should not apply to the moral and ethical
determinations of individuals and organizations that disapprove of such
unions. Whether a religion chooses to recognize such unions or condemn
them is an appropriate judgment for that body. If a religion prohibits
homosexual unions, that is a matter of church policy and religious ritual.
Marriage is also a legal status that stands apart from the church. It
has a variety of legal consequences with respect to tax laws, default rules of
inheritance, powers of substituted judgment, and often derivative benefits
in health and retirement plans. It has consequences for rights with re-
spect to children. The current challenge is whether these consequences
can constitutionally be restricted to opposite sex couples.
The first line of argument has been that all people have the same
right-to marry a person of the opposite sex. Our history with racial clas-
sifications has demonstrated the inadequacy of this response-if a man
can marry a woman, he has a right denied to women. The key argument
must lie with the classification itself. Can the classification be justified in
light of the purposes and function of the Fourteenth Amendment? Social
opprobrium and the distaste for such relationships suffice for private ex-
pressions of condemnation, but the racial cases suggest it is not sufficient
for purposes of governmental distinctions. We need to be able to distin-
guish between the standards applicable to private entities and those that
apply to our public selves.
The misuse of the string citation in Plessy does not demonstrate that
the gender classification in marriage is groundless or improper, but it cau-
tions that participants in the debate and those seeking solutions should
recognize that the appropriate standards for personal consideration of
propriety are very different than the standards to which a government
should be held. We should not use broad acceptance of a customary way
of doing things as a substitute for directly confronting the principles that
should apply to government commands.
248. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HI-iv. L. REv. 7, 17 (1969) (discussing minimum protection
theory in context of deprivation of rights).
470 [Vol. 52: p. 411
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